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Abstract 
The field of mass evacuation has existed for a long time. Already during the Roman Empire era 
evacuation problems were considered. In modern times, the field has gained more attention 
during the last couple of decades, especially for sports grounds and stadiums. Through analysis 
of some well-known historical crowd disasters and through a literature survey the aim has been 
to compile the most important findings. The aim has also been to analyze problem areas, 
knowledge and development opportunities. Regarding the problems of mass evacuation, 
preventive measures like design and contingency plan is of high importance. In addition, there is 
a need for good communication and to take proper actions when an accident occurs. Some 
phenomena that may arise during crowded situations have been found. These phenomena are an 
indication that a catastrophic situation might emerge. With knowledge and understanding of 
those the expectation is, with the help of live video recordings and simulation software, to get a 
warning about the elevated risk for the crowd. 
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 SUMMARY 
The purpose of this report has been to give a brief summary of the knowledge 
and research that have been conducted in the field of pedestrian and evacuation 
dynamics as well as behavior in fire, with focus on sport stadiums and other 
event areas. In addition, this report aims to be a basis for future students. In this 
summary, a number of important aspects and characteristics and how to handle 
these will be presented. 
The critical conditions that may arise are often characterized by crowding and 
movement at vulnerable locations at a stadium. These locations could be doors, 
gates, and passages or where many people might accumulate. When obstacles 
cause disturbance or when the spatial space narrows the flow naturally 
decreases and a phenomenon called bottleneck often occurs. Critical conditions 
may occur when highly dense crowds move. The cause for this is the pressure 
that builds and transmits and propagates through the crowd. 
Extremely high density may cause a crowd to, without reason, be unintentionally 
tumbled around. Forces propagate throughout the crowd in every direction and 
may cause people to fall. Research shows that a density of more than 7 persons / 
m2 can cause turbulence.  
The discover that turbulence is a strong indicator that catastrophic disasters are 
about to happen has led to an attempt to identify when situations may become 
critical. By using live video recordings and simulation software, situations that 
may become critical can be identified. The purpose of this is to warn the 
management and organizers before critical conditions occur. Proper actions can 
then be taken to prevent an accident. 
The use of computer simulations is a rapidly growing approach, where the 
capacity is primarily limited by the lack of data. Many of the experiments 
conducted on human behavior and evacuation are flawed as they are often based 
on smaller homogeneous groups, often consisting of young men, which does not 
reflect reality in a proper way. To develop these simulations, so they better 
match with reality, there is a need to gain more knowledge through analysis of 
real disasters and experiments. 
Crowd management is one way to achieve public safety. Some guidance on how 
to do this is presented in this paper. Crowd disasters are rarely to be blamed on 
the crowd itself, but instead organizers and poor management is the responsible 
parties. To achieve a good standard regarding public safety, contingency plans 
should exist. 
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1. Introduction 
This document is the final report in order to receive a Bachelor of Science degree 
in Fire Protection Engineering from the Department of Fire Safety Engineering at 
Lund University in Sweden. This report concludes with a degree equivalent to 
22.5 credits.  
In addition to this written part, the work was presented verbally at a public 
seminar held at Lund University. Finally a verbal opposition on one of the other 
student’s bachelor papers finished this project.  
1.1 Background 
The security at football- or soccer stadiums have recently been in focus due to 
the FIFA World Cup that was held in Brazil during the summer of 2014. This was 
also one of the major reasons for choosing this topic. 
The threats for these events include hooliganism, congestion, alcohol, flares or 
terrorist threats. In addition to this, mainly seen with Swedish point of view, 
hooliganism has escalated over the last few seasons. The wide threat leads to a 
variety of situations which may potentially challenge the security as well as the 
evacuation possibilities at similar events.  
Large crowd gatherings at confined spaces has proven to be dangerous. 
Throughout history, many disasters have occurred in large crowds, mainly at 
football stadiums and festival areas. The main reason for so many deaths is the 
high density of people. Is this this the only reason or is it a combination of 
factors? How will the spatial environment affect? Are there structural properties 
which can improve the safety? Or might there be organizational measures to be 
taken? 
This has led to a strong interest in examining how the evacuation and dynamics 
of large crowds occurs and if there are any problem areas. Is it only the high 
density that causes problems or are there other aspects as well? What have been 
the cause in the past and how can we prevent these disasters? 
Though the area of crowd dynamics and evacuation rests on a physical as well as 
a psychological basis, and depends on people's actions and reactions. It is vital to 
gain an understanding of these aspects.  
1.2 Purpose & Goal 
The purpose of this thesis is to study the theory and available material regarding 
evacuations, especially mass evacuations but also at an individual and group 
level. Great focus will be on human behavior and different movement patterns 
associated with evacuations of larger crowds.  
The goal is to study the research already conducted in the field and in a single 
document present a summary of the findings. The attempt is to make this report 
as easily understandable as possible. Another aim is to identify problem areas 
important for public safety and what essentially should be studied further in the 
future. 
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1.3 Questions at issue 
Before this literature survey started, a few questions arose that hopefully will be 
answered in this report. 
 How do people react when a fire or any other disaster occurs, which requires 
evacuation? 
 Are there any typical movement patterns during mass evacuations and what 
do they depend on? 
 What methods are used today to handle and develop knowledge around the 
area of mass evacuations? 
1.4 Method 
The method was based on a thorough literature research. After the main 
elements were compiled and summarized.  
A few disasters have been given extra focus in this report. These disasters were 
first described and then examined further, and the causes and mistakes were 
analyzed. 
A summary was made on how individuals are affected and behave during fires. 
Influence from other people and group behavior during and before they begin to 
move was examined.  
Different patterns during mass evacuations and in crowded situations were 
studied. Some simulation programs, with the attempt to predict and calculate 
movement time, and when and where critical situations could occur were 
explored. Different methods and guidelines that are used by management teams 
to prevent disasters have been evaluated.  
Finally an analysis and discussion of the report were conducted. Characteristics 
and patterns that have been found regarding crowd dynamics were summarized, 
areas that can be improved, such as weaknesses and uncertainties were then 
presented. 
A description of the method used in this paper is shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Method used in this paper 
1.4.1 Literature survey 
First a literature survey was conducted with the focus on human behavior, group 
dynamics, movement and behavior patterns in fire and evacuations. The most 
important aspects and theories of these studies were briefly summarized. The 
search services and materials that were used in this report are primarily Google 
Scholar, Lund University’s search service LUBSearch and available material from 
the course: Human Behavior in Fire, which is held at Lund University. Much of 
the material in this paper is based on are academic journals and case studies, 
thereby the reliability of the sources are considered to be justified. 
1.5 Scope & limitations 
One limitation was the lack of time which made it important to carefully select 
and study the materials that actually were relevant to this paper. If more time 
had been available the study could probably be more comprehensive.  
In addition to our own background as engineer students, an engineering point of 
view has naturally been used. Much of the literature used in this paper mainly 
focused on the social and psychological aspects. Insufficient understanding of 
these fields could implicate problems and misunderstandings. 
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2. Disasters & mass evacuations 
Throughout history mankind has experienced many disasters and accidents that 
have affected a large number of people. These disasters tend to highlight 
problem areas and therefore they are sadly required. In addition, they result in  
commitment and willingness for the society to develop the designs of buildings 
and safety systems. 
The definition of a mass evacuation is indistinct. One definition of mass 
evacuation that will be used in this paper highlights that there are three factors 
that have to be fulfilled (Drury & Cocking, 2007). 
1. A mass of people needs to be involved. 
2. There must be a perceived threat to life. 
3. And finally, there must be a reasonable chance that within a limited time, be 
able to escape from danger. 
 
Focus in this report is mainly on evacuations of larger public assembly locations, 
especially sports grounds, but also on areas were a large number of people are 
gathered within a small area, like a festival or during pilgrimages. In this chapter 
some disasters are briefly presented that have either affected evacuation 
possibility or highlighted problems with large crowd gatherings. These disasters 
will be further analyzed and discussed in chapter 7 and 8. 
2.1 Ibrox Football Stadium, 1971 
On January the 2nd in 1971, 66 spectators became victims and lost their lives to 
one of the first accidents that has been well documented at a sport ground. In 
addition to the deaths there were about 150 people that got injured. The 
accident took place at Ibrox Stadium, in Glasgow at the classic "Old Firm" game 
between the local rivals Rangers and Celtic. The disaster occurred in the final 
stages of the match, in context with a late equalizing goal, made by Rangers. 
Because of the magnitude of the match, and because of the late goal, people were 
euphoric. They sang and partied wildly. Moreover, a large part of the audience 
was noticeably influenced by alcohol which also could have affected the 
outcome. The arena had reached its maximum capacity and there were around 
80 000 people attending Ibrox this evening. These two factors, the euphoria of 
the spectators and the high pressure, due to the full seated stadium was 
underlying causes to the accident (Walker, 2004). 
The accident took place at stairway 13 when people fell and the main cause of 
death was compressive asphyxia as the people piled up. The theory behind the 
accident is still uncertain but it is believed to depend on someone tripping on his 
or her way down the stairway, a domino effect set in and more people fell over. 
Stairway 13 was the most frequently used staircase in the whole stadium, about 
20 000 people are believed to have used this stairway. The built up pressure that 
was created by the people from behind, as everybody was trying to leave the 
stadium at the same time, which increased the magnitude of this disaster. The 
people behind did not know that a person had fallen and continued to walk, this 
pressure made more and more people fall, which resulted in a pile of people 
(Walker, 2004). This accident is interesting for this report as it highlights a 
disaster that happened during egress and could therefore be likely to happen 
during an evacuation. The design for this egress route was inadequate and 
stressed the importance of design and functionality at sports grounds. 
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2.2 Bradford City fire, 1985 
On May the 11th, 1985 in the city of Bradford, UK, a small fire first started at the 
Valley Parade stadium's main grandstand at the northern end of the stand. The 
fire growth phase was rapid and only 7 minutes after ignition the whole stand 
was in flames. The match should have been a tribute to the team as they had just 
become champions of the division three in the English football. In this match, 
which was the last of the season, Bradford City’s Football Club faced Lincoln City. 
Festivities were held before and during the game to celebrate the team, including 
a parade. In addition to this, the team and various persons were awarded with 
prizes before the game. Also the team received a championship trophy. This 
attracted a lot of audience, and about 11,000 people are estimated to have been 
at the stadium that day. Around 5,000 of the spectators were located in the main 
grandstand. The fast spread of the fire made it impossible for all the spectators 
in the main grandstand to evacuate fast enough, which caused the deaths of 56 
persons and injured around 300. This is still one of the biggest tragedies in the 
English football (Klem, 1986); (Popplewell, 1985). This disaster is significant to 
this paper as the evacuation possibilities were challenged, because of the 
locations of evacuation routes and the rapid fire growth. Also certain behaviors 
in case of fire can be evaluated for this disaster. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Overview of the main grandstand of the Valley Parade stadium. 
2.2.1 Sequence of events 
 At 15.40 the rubbish under the stand was ignited and smell of the burning 
was detected by people. Police were informed and tried to locate fire 
extinguishers, which could not be found. 
 At 15.42 the timber beams beneath the floor were burning. Communication 
was established with police control center, which in turn contacted fire 
brigade. 
N 
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 At 15.43 flames were visible above the floor. The fans in the closest 
surrounding of the fire started to move down to the pitch or upwards toward 
the walk way or corridor leading to the exits. 
 At 15.44 the fire was several square meters and generated dark smoke which 
created critical conditions in the walk way.  
 At 15.44.30 a clearing off the pitch by the goalkeeper, took away the 
spectators attention from the game. Police ordered people close to the fire to 
move onto the field. Some people at the south end of the main stand started 
to move as well.  
 At 15.45 the flames had reached the ceiling and the fire was approximately 
10 m2. Critical conditions were reached in the back corridor. 
 At 15.46 flashover occurred. The closest surrounding was emptied but at the 
south end of the main stand, spectators were still present. Flames started to 
spread in that direction. By this time the fire brigade had arrived to the 
stadium. 
 At 15.47 almost the entire stand was in flames. At the very southern end of 
the stand a few people still tried move onto the pitch.  
2.3 Hillsborough disaster, 1989 
The 15th of April in 1989 another even more tragic disaster occurred in English 
football. Many blame the police and the security staff because that they admitted 
more spectators into the arena then it was designed for. When the capacity was 
exceeded pressure was built up from the people trying to enter from the back of 
the stand. As many as 96 people died and more than 400 got injured due to the 
crowd crush. Compressive asphyxia was the main cause of death (Stuart-Smith, 
1998); (Hillsborough Independent Panel, 2012). 
This accident occurred in the beginning of the FA Cup semi-finals between 
Liverpool and Nottingham Forest. Over 50,000 spectators were on the site this 
day. The match was played at a neutral location and for various reasons a large 
part of the audience were late. As a result of this the police had difficulties 
handling the large number of fans outside the stadium. To handle the escalating 
situation a new entrance was opened to enter the stands. Because of the 
excessive amount of people trying to enter, great forces and pressures 
propagated through the crowd. The people closest to the fences, that shielded 
the pitch, were finally crushed (Stuart-Smith, 1998); (Hillsborough Independent 
Panel, 2012). This disaster is of importance for this paper as it includes 
phenomenon during an ingress situation that is likely to happen during an 
evacuation. It highlights the importance of design of the stadium’s structure as 
well as crowd management and planning. 
2.4 The Love Parade disaster, 2010 
On the 24th of July 2010, a crowd crush occurred at a festival area in Duisburg, 
Germany. This disaster took the lives of 21 people and more than 500 people 
were injured. The cause of the tragedy is mainly blamed on bad planning as well 
as on the management team and the security personnel at the site (Klüpfel, 
2012). The disaster was created when a ramp that was used by people in the 
festival area met another stream of people who came from an underground 
tunnel. People constantly flowed into this area, but not as many got out which 
naturally increased the pressure. Finally it became too high and people 
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stumbled, and because of the high pressure people were crushed (Ma, et al., 
2013); (Helbing & Mukerji, 2012). The Love Parade disaster is interesting for 
this report because it points out different phenomena in pedestrian dynamics of 
large crowds. These phenomenons have been found to be indicators that 
conditions are critical and a disaster might occur. 
 
Figure 3. Overview of the Love Parade entrance area, the numbers illustrates different sequences that took 
place before the accident occurred. 
2.4.1 Sequence of events 
 The first couple of hours the entrance and exit systems functioned without 
problem. At around the time of 15.50 an ambulance drove through the 
tunnel.  
 This caused the police to form a cordon on the west side of the smaller exit 
ramp, blocking people to enter or leave through the tunnel in that direction, 
1) in Figure 3. 
 7 minutes later, a new cordon is formed on the eastern side of the tunnel, 2) 
in Figure 3.  
 At the eastern entrance point many gather as they try to enter the festival 
area, causing the police to move the cordon to the western side of the smaller 
exit ramp, 3) in Figure 3.  
 At about 16.03, why cannot be explained, a third cordon is formed at the 
narrowest point at the main ramp, allowing only a few people to pass 4) in 
Figure 3.  
 At 16.12 the third cordon prevent all people to leave the area through the 
main ramp. As more people try to leave, but are unable to, a crowded 
bottleneck is created at the ramp. The area between these 3 cordons is 
almost empty. The flow of people wanting to enter or leave the area, cause 
the other side of the cardons, both at the ramp and in the tunnel to be 
overcrowded.  
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 At 16.13 the second cordon, 2) in Figure 3 at the eastern side of the tunnel 
dissolves, and the crowd can then move towards the main entry and exit 
ramp.  
 At 16.20 the first cordon, 1) in Figure 3 on the western side of the main ramp 
is dissolved. Flows from two direction overcrowd the lower part of the main 
ramp 5) in Figure 3. By this time two very dense crowds with a desire to 
move in opposite directions, are separated by the third cordon, 4) in Figure 
3.  
 For the next 20 minutes the density increases, as more people want to enter 
but the third cordon still exist, and due to this overcrowding, the disaster 
occurs (LoveparadeDuisburg, 2010).  
2.5 Pilgrimages to Mecca 
The pilgrimage to Mecca is an event that annually endures highly dense crowds. 
Each year between 2 and 3 million pilgrims gather to perform religious rituals 
(The Guardian, 2006); (Still, 2014). Several accidents of different magnitude 
have occurred. The reason has often been the large number of people, and when 
the crowd in addition constantly moves, high pressures are created (Helbing & 
Mukerji, 2012).  
 
Figure 4. Pilgrimage to Mecca - Jamarat bridge (Al Bosta, 2010) 
It has over the years been a number of serious incidents that have claimed many 
innocent lives during these pilgrimages. Most of these disasters have occurred as 
a result of that people have stumbled, due to the high pressure have many of 
those who has fallen later on been trampled to death. Something that is usually 
described with the word stampede. The worst of these accidents occurred in July 
2nd, 1990. The disaster took place inside a tunnel that led people out of Mecca. 
The underlying cause for the accident is believed to depend on an overcrowded 
tunnel, which in turn made people fall. The high pressure that constantly was 
generated from people behind resulted in 1,400 people to be trampled to death. 
This scenario has been described as a stampede accident (Al Bosta, 2010); (Still, 
2014); (The Guardian, 2006). The pilgrimage is of interest to this paper because 
of the high density of a moving crowd. There is probably not another place on 
earth where such a large dense crowd annually assembles. Some phenomenon 
regarding pedestrian dynamic that has occurred during the pilgrimage, might be 
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comparable and transferable for possible evacuation scenarios at sport events or 
other large crowd gatherings. 
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3. Human behavior in fires & evacuations 
To understand how mass evacuation works, it is essential to gain an 
understanding of the underlying psychology. How a person behaves in a certain 
situation depends on a lot of factors, e.g. personal matters and if the person is 
alone, or in a group when the fire occurs or another threat which constitute an 
emergency situation.  
Even though a lot has been done in this field in the last decades it is vital to know 
that science, based on human behavior cannot completely be compared to other 
scientific disciplines. Mostly because that the results and the assumptions is not 
based on a universal validity like mathematics and physics. For example, a 
research made in Sweden cannot be assumed to be applied all over the world. 
The same thing can be said about studies that have been done on a particular 
test group, such as age or gender. It is unclear how these results, in an acceptable 
way, can be applied to other groups. The reason for this is that the different 
individual factors for behavior described in this chapter, can certainly be 
expected to vary with the cultural, social and geological environment. In Sweden, 
fire drills are a common occasion during the primary school years, which will 
influence one’s behavior and actions during an emergency situation. The same 
cannot be said for poor, developing countries where school access is limited or 
not existing. People with such a different background and knowledge cannot be 
expected to behave in the same matter (Brannigan & Kilpatrick, 2004). 
The studies that are conducted in the area regarding human behavior is often 
based on empirical studies based from both real events and experiments and 
conducted mostly on different homogenous test groups. It is important to point 
out that there will thus always be uncertainties in this area, and that it is 
important to understand that these uncertainties gives results that cannot, 
straight of, be universally applicable (Brannigan & Kilpatrick, 2004). 
Most of these behaviors have been discovered in the presence of fire. Fire can be 
expected to have the same impact on people as other threats to life safety. 
Although there does not have to be an immediate threat to motivate an 
evacuation, which will be presented later in this paper. Emergencies can arise 
even without a specific threat but instead due to high density of people, and most 
of the behavior presented in this section could be assumed to occur even in those 
situations.  
Studies on behavior in fire situation or other emergencies for large crowds are 
limited. Instead most focus has been on individual level, and for smaller 
populations. But it is the individuals that constitute a crowd, and therefore the 
behaviors observed in smaller groups can be assumed to exist in larger crowds 
as well.  
3.1 Individual behavior 
In order to understand behavior during fire and emergency situation, one must 
know that not everyone will behave in the same way at a certain situation. 
Therefore, it is vital to first know what different characteristics and factors there 
are, such as age, gender, educational level, previous experience and cultural 
impact. It is also essential to know how those factors actually matter during an 
evacuation.  
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3.1.1 Uncertainty 
A questionnaire was conducted by Hopper and colleagues, on people who 
experienced fires in their homes. This questionnaire indicated that people 
actually have a poor understanding the different kinds of fire cues that exist. The 
perception of the danger from smoke and pyrolysis exposed that people often 
underestimated the seriousness of this. The lack of knowledge of these cues may 
lead to worse accidents than necessary, it also indicates that there are risks that 
a long and valuable time will go before people understand the seriousness of the 
danger and begins to either evacuate or fight the fire (Hopper, et al., 2002). 
Emergencies differ from one to another and the information to the public during 
a fire is usually ambiguous. Smelling smoke, hearing the alarm or observing 
confused staff or other people may not indicate a direct emergency feeling or 
realizing that there actually is a fire. The situation is for most people unusual and 
unexpected when being at a public place. (Proulx, 1993) 
3.1.2 Problem solving & decision making 
In the case of an emergency the occupants of a building are faced with problem 
solving. A classic problem solving model has been developed by Polya (1957). It 
includes four cognitive stages (Proulx, 1993). 
1. Understand the problem. Define situation and determine the problem. 
2. Devising a plan. Look for information, make decisions and structuring 
actions. 
3. Carry out the plan, execution of previous made decisions.  
4. Assessing if the action made is solving the problem at hand. 
 
First step is of most importance in case of a fire. It is the most decisive step. The 
time spent on evaluating the situation, seconds or even minutes, in a non-
evacuation behavior, leads to less time for the actual evacuation. The information 
gathered in the first step is the basic for devising a plan to solve the problem. If 
information is missed, under- or overvalued or if the situation is not interpreted 
right, this will lead to incorrect and improper decision making (Proulx, 1993). 
In the first stage the information may come from different sources. In case of a 
fire it might come from smoke or maybe even seeing the flames. It could also be a 
spoken message or a fire alarm. Other people may also be the source of 
information. Likewise the environment which one is present in has impact on the 
information as well as that previous experience in similar environment or 
situations (case of emergency) may have an impact (Proulx, 1993). 
In the second stage when one is devising a plan, there are two common 
reactions. When given ambiguous information in a public place, one ignores the 
situation or investigates the situation further. Ignoring is more common because 
people tend to fall back in to their normal roles, when located at a public place, 
as customers or visitors, who does not take action. They usually assume it is the 
staff’s responsibility to deal with the situation and does not want to overreact to 
a situation which is already under control and thereby lose face in front of 
others, leaving one with a feeling of shame. Investigating means interacting with 
other people and in that way try to identify the situation. Sometimes the person 
needs to get a grasp of the nature of the incident. This often implies that the 
person is moving towards the threat, in this case of a fire. According to literature 
in decision making during risk situations, in case of a fire people will not use all 
available information from the situation, but instead focus on the options one 
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feels more likely to solve the problem. In such case when a quick solution is 
needed, a well-run decision plan could be applied. For evacuees this means 
evacuating trough a familiar route, usually through the main entrance which one 
used to enter the building (Proulx, 1993). 
3.1.3 Gender  
Differences between men and women during an evacuation are found differ the 
most in the earliest stages. When a person first notice that there is a possible 
emergency going on, men use to seek after more information than women do, in 
attempt to further understand what caused the alarm. Later on when smoke, or 
the fire itself is recognized, there are some other typical differences between the 
genders. Women tend to warn others, and they also tend to close the door to the 
fire room, before they then leave the building. Women use to seek for help, in 
contrast to men, who on the other hand more often tries to extinguish the fire by 
themselves as well as they are more likely to search for people who has been 
trapped in the fire (Canter, et al., 1980). It is possible that some of the differences 
between the genders have decreased over the past years, mainly due to an 
increased equality.  
How a person experiences a situation varies. A study on route choice revealed 
that there were some variations due to gender. Women showed a tendency to 
rather choose a corridor instead of a door, even though the door was wider, the 
explanation of this behavior could, due to the analysis, be the uncertainty of the 
egress behind the closed door. This analysis also showed that especially women 
associated dark and narrow exits with negativity (Dijkstra, et al., 2012). 
3.1.4 Cultural 
A person that has grown up in the same environment and country finds it easier 
to adapt to the common movements of crowds. It has been indicated that people 
from different countries and cultures find it harder to fall into these common 
patterns. This indicates that the movement pattern depends on learning. 
Something that reinforces the importance of understanding how this cultural 
factor influences (Helbing & Johansson, 2009). 
3.1.5 Age 
Another study indicates that people either are focusing on seeking information 
or in helping others during the initial phase of an emergency. This study focuses 
mostly on people of different ages. It revealed that younger people spent more 
time in seeking information about the emergency than elderly ones. On the 
contrary, the younger persons spent less time in helping others. This suggests 
that younger people do not believe in the safety systems as much as the elders 
and that the elderly cares more about helping others. The same study tells us 
that people with disabilities need more time in their attempts to search for 
information (Kuligowski & Hoskins, 2010). 
3.1.6 Stress 
A natural response to a perceived threat is the feeling of stress. Stress is an 
automatic, human defense reaction and it evolves when the body adjusts, in 
order to prepare itself to act physically. It adjusts to either fight or to flee from 
the perceived danger. When people gets exposed to elevated stress levels their 
logical thinking gets limited. Even the social ability gets reduced, which instead 
becomes more reflexive. Stress is subjective and a situation is therefore 
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perceived differently from person to person. When a person no longer feels that 
he or she is able to handle a certain situation their stress levels increases 
(Säterhed, et al., 2008). 
3.1.7 Panic 
When discussing the concept of panic, the research in this paper indicates there 
is a need for a strict definition of panic, at least for the field of human behavior. 
According to Goldenson panic is a “reaction involving terror, confusion and 
irrational behaviour precipitated by a threatening situation” (Fahy, et al., 2009).  
Another definition is that of Johnson; “behavior involves selfish competition 
uncontrolled by social and cultural constraints,” and “breaking of social order, 
competition unregulated by social forces” (Fahy, et al., 2009). 
Panic is an extreme stress response that prepares the body to flee or fight. Panic 
limits the intellect to act for survival. Therefore, in many cases it is practically 
impossible to communicate with a person in panic (Säterhed, et al., 2008). 
Mawson defines panic as a term that describe behavior during extraordinary 
circumstances. Panic refers to inappropriate and excessive, or intense fear and-
or flight behavior (Mawson, 2005). 
Keating defined panic as a concept of four elements (Fahy, et al., 2009): 
 Hope to escape through dwindling resources. 
 Contagious behavior. 
 Aggressive concern about one's own safety. 
 Irrational, illogical responses. 
An additional definition of panic comes from Quarantelli, “panic as an acute fear 
reaction marked by flight behaviour and the panic participant as nonrational in 
his flight behavior” (Fahy, et al., 2009). 
The definitions above are from the field of human behavior and psychology. For 
the general public panic is more likely to be defined as according to the Oxford 
English Dictionary; “A sudden feeling of alarm or fear of sufficient intensity or 
uncontrollableness as to lead to extravagant or wildly unthinking behaviour, 
such as that which may spread through a crowd of people; the state of 
experiencing such a feeling. Also: an instance or episode of such feeling; a scare” 
(Panic, 2014). 
These findings highlight the need for a joint definition, at least in the field of 
human behavior, in order to determine if panic actually does occur. According to 
previously mentioned definitions, irrational responses and actions seems to be 
the mutual feature.  
Mass panic has been believed to be the natural response to physical danger. 
Recent findings actually points to the contrary, that mass panic and hysteria is 
not the common response, on the subject of the initial state fire alert. Media 
often reports fire with the word panic. This lead to a misconception for the 
public, that fire causes people to panic (Mawson, 2005); (Fahy, et al., 2009). 
Individuals frequently speak of 'panic' as a description of the emotional state 
they are in as an evaluation of their capacity to respond to a situation when they 
feel stressed, anxious or fearful. Panic could also be used as a way to describe the 
behavior of others who show emotions like anxiety, frightened or scared, or who 
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does not responds in the most appropriate manner for the current situation 
(Fahy, et al., 2009). Instead people tend to seek familiarity, move to known 
locations and gather with familiar people. Separation from familiar people is a 
greater stressor than the experience of physical danger, e.g. a fire or bomb threat 
(Mawson, 2005). 
Studies show that during a disaster or emergency situation, fear is dominated by 
a collective mutual aid sense. People come together and become helpful instead 
of their normally egoistic behavior (Mawson, 2005); (Drury & Cocking, 2007). 
Usually panic is valuated after a certain event by observers of people who 
experience panic, and the actions taken may seem as inappropriate, excessive, 
irrational or highly intense by the observers. In case of fire, a collective mass 
may rush towards an exit, as this may seem as the only rational action to take. 
Observers may label this collective flight behavior labeled as panic although it is 
arbitrary (Mawson, 2005); (Sime, 1995). 
The misconception that mass panic occurs in case of a fire emergency can in fact 
be more hazardous than the threat itself. Especially at public places, such as 
public buildings or venues like different sport grounds, where the occupancy 
could reach tens of thousands of people. Management may not give the proper 
information about the threat and furthermore the responses needed by the 
occupants in the building may be delayed, because of the fear of having to deal 
with a mass of irrational people. When an evacuation is critical due to a fire, time 
is of essence (Fahy, et al., 2009). 
Almost every research in human behavior points out that mass panic is rare, at 
least in fire emergencies. From people who have faced an immediate danger, that 
threated their lives, panic is often used to describe their heightened state of 
senses. In retrospective, after interviews with evacuees, the action taken 
indicates that panic probably was not the case as the responses were rational 
behaviors. As long as media continues to use the word panic and thereby 
reinforces the impression that it is a usual and probably unavoidable occurrence, 
the concern for panic will remain for the public (Fahy, et al., 2009). 
3.1.8 Individual roles 
A person can act in totally different ways, depending on the time and place for 
the emergency. This depends on the role that the person has at the moment of 
the fire. A person who is renting a room at a hotel or is at a public location, most 
likely will be more passive compared to if he or she would have been at home. 
Instead of taking proper actions, the individual will be waiting for instructions 
on what he or she is supposed to do. The reason to this behavior is caused by the 
occupants’ role as a guest. If the same person would have been at home instead, 
the person’s action most possibly would have been more capable of action. This 
indicates that it is of major value to handle out useful information as early as 
possible, especially in locations and buildings were the occupant does not have 
prior knowledge of structure of the building or routines as well (Canter, et al., 
1980). 
3.2 Group behavior 
One important aspect in predicting human behaviors, during fires and 
emergencies is group influence. How a person handle a certain situation depends 
a lot on the environment as well as the surrounding individuals.  
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3.2.1 Social influence 
Research has revealed that surrounding people and their behavior most likely 
will have an influence during an evacuation. This is called the social influence. It 
has also indicated that people often are afraid of making a fool of themselves. 
Especially when they are in a group of unknown people. This phenomenon often 
leads to delayed decision times. But as fast as someone in the group takes the 
first step, and for example begins to walk to an exit door or just stands up, others 
are likely to follow (Nilsson & Johansson, 2009). 
In another study that has been done regarding evacuations out of large retail 
stores, other factors were found. Indications are given that when a fire alarm or 
any other factor occurs that results in an evacuation. Half of the individuals will 
still stay in the area trying to find their relatives or companions until they then 
start to evacuate (Shields & Boyce, 2000). It has also been shown that a crucial 
factor in influencing the direction of a person’s movement, during an evacuation, 
were a combination of the person’s role and his or her familiarity with the routes 
and the structures of the building. If the individual’s friends or family were 
elsewhere in the building the person would likely try to find them first before 
evacuation could be started. This is called the affiliative model, which state that 
people have a willingness to seek the familiarity during evacuation conditions 
(Sime, 1985).  
Mawson has further explored and developed the concept of the affiliative model 
by Sime. Social ties have an effect on the human behavior during disaster. The 
social group which one is connected to usually tries to stay together during the 
evacuation. In addition employees do not abandon their responsibilities during 
an emergency, instead they do what they are trained to do and try to help people 
evacuate (Mawson, 2005). 
Flight-and-affiliation is a rare behavior where people escape from a specific 
situation and move toward another situation or location that is perceived as 
familiar but not necessary safe. The occurrence of flight-and-affiliation depends 
mostly on the whereabouts of familiar people, where they are. In the absence of 
attachment figures who generates a calming effect, the probability of flight-and-
affiliation behavior will increase (Mawson, 2005). 
People in groups of familiar faces has a general tendency to react slower to initial 
warnings, slower to leave the area and delay their desire to reconnect with 
unknown people before starting the evacuation. The assumed reaction of panic 
and hysteria, will lead to a desire of the officials in charge not to give or delay 
information about the situation, due to fear of panic spread. By doing so, this 
could lead to entrapment or death because insufficient information is provided 
meaning appropriate actions by the evacuees may not be taken (Mawson, 2005).  
An experiment from Columbia University indicates that people's ability to act 
during an emergency gets negatively affected if unfamiliar people surround 
them. This negative affect especially occurs if the people around are passive and 
does not respond to, for example, the fire alarm or the presence of smoke. One of 
the reasons of this negative group behavior depends on the social influence. It 
has also been indicated that a person can gain much information about an 
emergency only by looking at others and their behaviors. In this way, a person 
can avoid breaking norms, such as the risk to be making a fool of her- or himself 
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when taking an own decision. Instead the person can observe what others are 
doing and then be acting in accordance with their behavior. This process is called 
normative social influence, the strength of this influence is mainly due to the 
distance. It gets stronger, the closer the persons are from each other (Nilsson & 
Johansson, 2009). 
3.2.2 Social identity 
When a person joins a high-density group of people, e.g. football stadium or at a 
concert, the individuals one by one will change their usual attitude and 
mentality. The people at those events have the same expectations and feelings. 
The crowd can be considered to gain a collective personality and the individuals’ 
personalities reduce (Hoskin & Spearpoint, 2004). 
A study presents an approach on group behavior that is called social identity. 
During many disasters evidence has pointed out how people, even do they are 
unfamiliar with each other’s, are more likely to give help than in normal 
everyday situations. It has been shown that humans behave differently, as well 
as that they are having different personalities, depending on the operating 
environment and the group that they are a part of. One interesting thing is that 
this approach, the social identity, reinforces why some typical group behavior 
occurs. In many situations, such as war or sports, people sacrifice themselves for 
people they normally do not like or might not even know. The social identity 
approach and theory is mainly formulated in order to obtain a greater 
understanding of how people affects when being part of a collective which 
mainly consists of strangers. This is a typical situation that occurs during 
disasters (Drury & Cocking, 2007). 
The social identity approach relies on the theory that people, independent on the 
members, have a tendency to follow their groups. This behavior increases the 
more the person can identify with the group. It has also been shown that a group 
member expect to get, as well as give help to others in a greater extent than 
persons who is not part of a group (Drury & Cocking, 2007). 
It has been indicated that some typical group behavior can be explained by the 
group’s social identity. These identities are divided between the psychological 
crowd and the aggregate crowd (Drury & Cocking, 2007). 
 Psychological crowd, for example the people attending a football or hockey 
stadium.  
 Aggregate crowd, such a group can for example be, the occupants that is 
inside a supermarket at the same time. 
 
The major difference between those groups is that a psychological crowd shares 
a common feeling and aim. Which gives a stronger bond between those members 
compared to the example in the grocery store. People that are exposed to an 
extreme threat or a disaster get this special fellowship and bond as well, it can be 
compared to the collective crowd feeling that the spectators at a hockey game 
has. There are three major points that primarily will stand out, those points has 
been proved to be stronger in groups that is based on a psychological crowd 
behavior (Drury & Cocking, 2007). 
1. People feel more concern for other people in the group, even to strangers.  
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2. A stronger pattern of cooperation, but also tendencies of wanting to give help 
in a higher sentence as well as that self-sacrifices are elevated.  
3. People in those groups expect assistance to a greater extent. 
Interviews have been carried out with some of the survivors from different 
accidents. They were asked if they could describe the common feeling of the 
group or the crowd that they were part of at the accident. Personal feelings as 
well as what themselves and the people around them did were also asked. It was 
not unexpected that the usual ethics were maintained during the accident, such 
as people waiting for their turn in the queue and that people that were 
authoritarians before the accident continued on this track, even during the 
accident. In addition, it was found that most people showed most empathy about 
each other in the smaller groups that they had arrived to the event with (Drury & 
Cocking, 2007). 
3.3 Pre-movement 
The pre-movement phase is used when modeling behavior during evacuation, to 
describe time passed from when a person or group first becomes aware of the 
danger, until they make any decisions of what to do. When a fire occurs, people 
adjacently located usually get awareness of the situation, for example by seeing 
the smoke, hearing the fire alarm or by other people telling them about the fire. 
But still a lot of people do not decide to evacuate until it is already too late and in 
other cases there is a lack of understanding in where the escape routes are 
(Hopper, et al., 2002). Why this happens and some of the underlying reasons to 
this behavior are presented in the following chapter.  
3.3.1 The evaluation process 
It is vital to understand that there is a constant decision making process when 
being exposed to new situations, especially when danger or a threat like fire is 
present. The process can be compared by a circle. During the pre-movement, a 
person starts to evaluate the information he- or she has available at that 
moment. Then a decision on either gathering more information, evacuate or fight 
the fire is made. The situation or at least the understanding of the situation 
constantly develops. Every single time the occupant gets new information of the 
fire or any other circumstances, a new and updated decision-circle is obtained. 
This implies that a decision that first has been taken often is changed along the 
way of the movement. This behavior is described by the role-rule model 
developed by Canter and colleagues and is illustrated in  Figure 5. The concept of 
role-rule model Figure 5 (Canter, et al., 1980). 
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Figure 5. The concept of role-rule model. 
When a person finally understands the danger in a situation, most individuals 
use to choose between to either evacuate or to stay and try to fight the fire 
(Hopper, et al., 2002). If a person decides to evacuate most of the persons tend to 
use the same way out of a building or area as the one they entered through (Till 
& Babcock, 2010); (Sime, 1995). 
3.3.2 Knowledge & Understanding 
One major problem can be that persons, especially young people, are poor at 
predicting both fire growth as the seriousness of fires. It has also been shown 
that this group of people found it difficult to decide when a fire is possible to 
extinguish (Fridolf & Nilsson, 2011). 
Another study supports the allegation that people are poor at predicting the 
dangerousness of fires. It is also common that people deny fire cues, or any other 
signal that suggests that an accident will occur. Instead of accepting the cues is it 
common that people tries to find explanations, trying to reject the danger in the 
situation. If a person is busy with a task or an activity that demands focus, it is 
even more likely that the cues will be missed. In addition to this the same study 
indicates how people are more risk-aware in unknown buildings then what they 
are in their own homes. This behavior is a problem, especially though the risks of 
fatalities and injuries in homes still is far greater than in other buildings 
(Hopper, et al., 2002). 
Another problem in this phase is often that people do not know what possible 
options they have during an evacuation. Humans are creatures of habits and it 
has been shown that most people tend to take the same way out of a building as 
the one they entered through (Hopper, et al., 2002). This has led to problem of 
emergency exits, those doors and routes are in many cases not used as they have 
been designed for. To succeed in an evacuation, it is important that people 
actually are using all the escape routes as intended. This problem area has led to 
a lot of research in attempts to increase the attractiveness of escape routes- and 
doors and to make people more willing in their efforts to use them (Proulx, 
1993).  
A study indicates that both men and women tend to get dressed in order to look 
proper, they also gather their belongings before they begin to evacuate. This 
behavior often occurs even if it is a waste of valuable time. The behavior may 
depend on the probability of meeting others on the way out of the building and 
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the fact that people are afraid of making a fool of themselves (Canter, et al., 
1980). 
3.3.3 Fire alarms & designs 
It is common that even though people hear a fire alarm, many assume either that 
the alarm is being tested, that it might be an exercise or that the alarm most 
likely started because of an error. It is a problem that many people do not believe 
in these systems, which can lead to problems and accidents (Drury & Cocking, 
2007).  
To enhance the opportunities for people to better understand what they are 
expected to do during fire alarms and evacuations, studies have shown that 
different types of affordances are needed. An affordance helps you to understand 
what to do and how. Those are divided on sensory, cognitive, physically and 
functionally affordances. These affordances are presented in the following text. 
Affordances are especially interesting when designing buildings and escape 
routes (Nilsson, 2009). 
 Sensory- An emergency exit needs to be easily visible. This can be 
implemented by using a different color than the walls surrounding it.  
 Cognitive- To open a door or to use an emergency route the person who is 
supposed to use it actually needs to understand that it should be used and it 
should not discourage people by looking hazardous. Studies have shown that 
it is good to complement signs with flashing lights. Especially green lights are 
good, because of the positive association that it brings.  
 Physical- In order to help people, an emergency door or route should 
primarily be easy to access, the door should not require too much strength.  
 Functional- A functional door or route is one that can provide a powerful 
combination of the three affordances named above; sensory, cognitive and 
physical.  
Beyond this, it is important that the affordances do not send contradictory 
signals. For example if an escape route or door also is provided with a conflicting 
plate, like the “only personnel sign” then the door will most likely not be used, or 
at least be used in a lesser extent (Nilsson, 2009). The same aspect concerns fire 
messages, which often fail because that the clarity is failing. Suggestions is made 
that those messages, to a greater extent, should specify how the fire or danger 
has occurred and what the individuals is supposed to do in accordance to avoid 
it, like finding the closest emergency exit and then transport themselves out of 
the building as fast as possible (Hopper, et al., 2002).  
3.3.4 Denying the danger 
A situation or condition that may affect the outcome and the amount of time 
spent for a person to move out of the building is freezing. The danger with this 
condition is that a person's instinctive response to save themselves from danger 
becomes attenuated. There are other reactions that affect the outcome 
negatively, people have shown tendencies to ignore the danger in situations and 
instead pretend like nothing has happened, a natural defense mechanism. A 
facade with an unusual calmness is created, those persons often continue with 
their everyday tasks. This will make these people waste valuable time before 
reaching safety (Drury & Cocking, 2007). 
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3.4 Movement 
How fast a person can perform a safe egress out of a building or area depends on 
a lot of factors. Some of the things that matter are the person’s physical 
attributes, age, gender, knowledge of the building, disabilities as well as the 
structure of escape routes- and doors. In attempts of calculate an evacuation this, 
the movement, is often the easiest part. How fast different people can move is 
well known and easy to measure and concretize. The problematic part though is 
to learn how to design buildings in a proper way, taking into account all various 
types of people. Another difficulty is to cover all the different scenarios that can 
occur during an emergency and thus affect the available evacuation possibilities. 
3.4.1 Speed 
Some of the factors that concerns how fast a person can move depends on, for 
example, how fast a person can react and understand the situation. The physical 
ability is one major factor, both individually as well as for a group level, which 
will impact the walking speed. Other factors could be age, gender, clothing or 
disabilities. When people are evacuating as a group is it usually the weakest and 
slowest person that affects how fast the movement can be carried out. If 
something interrupts the movement, like observing or fighting the fire the 
movement will be slowed down. It also depends on how well the individual 
knows the buildings structure and routes (Hopper, et al., 2002); (Fahy & Proulx, 
2001).  
At larger venues, such as a stadium, having evacuation strategies could indeed 
improve the movement phase. It might be desirable to have evacuation in 
different phases. For a large stadium there could be more than 50,000 people 
present and movement to safety might be delayed due to high densities. In case 
of a fire, those in the closest perimeter endure the greatest risk. If strategies are 
established to focus on those people first, the risk could be minimized as they 
could evacuate in a faster manner (ISO, 2009). 
Empirical studies and experiments have given data on different walking speeds 
for different types of occupants and buildings type (Fahy & Proulx, 2001). 
Walking speed in crowds is indicated to depend on density and the distance to 
the person ahead. Increased density and decreased distance will reduce the 
speed (Nilsson, 2007). 
3.4.2 Structural impacts 
There is a need to understand how the environment can influence people during 
the evacuation. Studies have been done on investigating how color will influence 
behavior. Those studies have been used in order to try to figure out how to best 
design the buildings. Indications have shown that the movement phase is 
improved if the corridors have transparency, i.e. doors at the end are 
transparent. This enables people to understand and collect information on 
where to go next. Transparency is especially important in the closest range of 
decision points. Furthermore studies regarding color psychology have indicated 
that bright colors like green, blue or white have a positive and calming effect on 
people which is important during emergency situations, though it enhances the 
ability to take rational decisions (Abu-Safieh, 2010). 
Structural impact is a relatively new science field. The knowledge about how a 
building and its structure affects people is now constantly developing. It has 
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been shown how fast a person can bring him- or herself out of a building or area, 
can be improved by making some architectural features. The wayfinding has 
been indicated to be improved, if the egress routes are wide and bright. This is 
most important in corridors (Dijkstra, et al., 2012). 
In the same way it has been indicated that one must not only think of the 
buildings structural and geometry when designing evacuation routes and doors, 
but also to consider how the natural flows looks. Where do most people stay and 
likewise what areas will be most crucial in an emergency? With this aspect in 
mind, it is vital to use architectural competences in attempts to naturally lead 
persons to safe areas, like evacuation routes- and doors (Shields & Boyce, 2000). 
Human behavior during the movement phase has been studied. The focus was to 
decide how exit signs influence peoples’ evacuation performance. The test 
subjects had to wear portable eye-tracking devises, and both people with 
experience and knowledge of the buildings, as well as people without were 
studied. The analysis revealed how the people with experience evacuated 
throughout the building without any use of the signs. Among the persons 
without experience two approaches were found, those who did not focus on the 
signs at all and only trusted on their instincts and those who actually used the 
signs. Not surprisingly, people with prior knowledge and the people that used 
the signs were able to evacuate the building faster (Till & Babcock, 2010). 
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4. Pedestrian dynamics & crowd movement patterns 
In mass evacuations, human behavior continuous to be an important factor, but 
the individuals cannot affect the crowd dynamics individually. When the density 
of the crowd becomes critical, the group behavior dominates and the movement 
pattern will instead look more like a natural flow, which can be compared to a 
gas or a fluid (Helbing, et al., 2001). Every year crowd disasters of different 
magnitudes occur, resulting in fatal outcomes (Helbing, et al., 2007). Recently 
more research has been conducted for pedestrian movement in high-density 
crowds (Ma, et al., 2013). During events when a lot of people gather in 
concentrated spaces, such as sport arenas, festivals or pilgrimages, a few 
different patterns often occurs. Those are sometimes the cause of disasters, like 
crowd crushes or stampede. In order to figure out how those movement patterns 
work, why and when they occur and how to handle them it is important to 
analyze this area. 
4.1 Pedestrian movements 
Humans are social beings, driven by needs and goals. Social interaction and 
acceptance are important foundations. It has been found that the movements of 
humans follow some specific rules and patterns. If there is a choice between 
routes, most often the simplest and most direct route will be chosen. Which 
mainly depends on that people does not like to take detours to reach their goals 
(Säterhed, et al., 2008). People attending an event, e.g. a football game, tend to 
fall into a more collective personality, and the movement patterns at those 
occasions differ significantly from how people usually move in high densities. 
The high density and the fact that the people are there for the same reasons 
make it acceptable for people to move closer to each other than normal. This 
allows the crowd to move faster than otherwise possible in an equal setting with 
a different mentality of the crowd. People follow the flow of the crowd instead of 
taking own decisions on where to go and at what speed (Hoskin & Spearpoint, 
2004). 
Crowd movement is described by three qualitative characteristics (Proulx, 
2002). 
 
1. Density. 
2. Speed. 
3. Flow.  
Density is the measurement of people per unit, often expressed in people/m2. 
Speed is often expressed as distance per unit time, i.e. m/s. Flow is the number of 
people passing a specific reference point expressed in people/s.  
These three characteristics have a relation in the form of  
Flow = Speed * Density * Width (Proulx, 2002). 
There are certain patterns that pedestrians have tendencies to follow. People 
have a desire to walk with their own, individual speed as long as they are not in a 
hurry, and the distance between pedestrians varies mainly depending on the 
density and on how the flow velocity changes. When these factors increase, the 
acceptable distance between one and another is reduced. Pedestrians can be 
compared to car drivers, as they often take automated decisions. Which means 
that they sometimes can take non-optimal decisions, e.g. standing in the way for 
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someone else even though this behavior is time consuming (Helbing, et al., 
2001). 
It has been shown that pedestrians tend to walk along with others more than 
alone. Since these smaller groups strongly will affect the overall pattern it is 
important to analyze what typical movement patterns these groups actually 
have. As many as two-thirds of the people often travels in groups, mostly 
together with two to four other members. The movement pattern in those 
groups differs, mainly depending on the density. At lower densities, the people in 
the group often gather around the one, or two people who speak the most. The 
group is gathered in a pattern that looks like a V-formation, mainly because 
everyone in the group should have the opportunity to hear what the others say. 
At higher densities though, does it become a struggle between social integration 
and the physical limitations, mainly because the V-shape is not aerodynamic. 
When the density finally becomes too high the physical limitations wins and the 
persons are forced to walk in line with each other’s (Moussaïd, et al., 2010). 
4.2 Counter flows 
One of the many phenomena, or patterns, that pedestrian dynamics generates 
arises when different flows meet each other. Lanes are often formed when 
humans are walking in the same direction (Helbing, et al., 2002). When two such 
lanes meets, and need to cross each other’s, there are tendencies that the facing 
groups takes into account one another and are forming, effective, penetrating 
stripes. Those strips reduce the friction and make the movement pattern more 
energy-efficient in order to facilitate the passage for all parties involved. This is a 
pattern, and a human group behavior that occurs naturally, which suggests that 
it depends- and relies on an emergency group behavior. Especially people who 
have grown up in similar environments tend to, in a quick and easy way, be able 
to coordinate themselves in this way, even though they never have met each 
other before (Helbing & Johansson, 2009); (Ma, et al., 2013). 
4.3 Bottlenecks 
When the natural flow of pedestrians cannot continue due to a door, corridor or 
any other obstacle that does not allow the entire flow to get through at once, a 
bottleneck situation occurs (Drury & Cocking, 2007). The flow of pedestrians 
varies with a frequency that depends on the width and length of the bottleneck. 
The longer and narrower it is, the slower the flow. This phenomenon can be 
compared with the function of a sandglass (Helbing, et al., 2001). 
 
Figure 6. The principle of a bottleneck situation. 
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When a person near the bottlenecks center manages to find an opening, and thus 
can escape from the bottleneck, a field or lane is created after this person. This 
makes it easier for people that are directly connected to do the same. When 
people manage to get out from one side of the bottleneck the pressure decreases 
temporarily at that site. The result is that the people from the other side begins 
to push and move against this new, available space, which in the end creates a 
fluctuating pattern (Helbing & Johansson, 2009); (Ma, et al., 2013); (Helbing, et 
al., 2002). This phenomena is consistent with the theory that pedestrian 
movements can be compared to a granular flow and in accordance to the second 
law of the thermodynamics, a closed system always strive for balance and 
equilibrium (Helbing, et al., 2001). 
Bottlenecks are sometimes the most crucial during an evacuation. When there 
are counteracting flows in a bottleneck, there is a risk of clogging. This has been 
proved to, sometimes, happen to granular flows through funnels. To prevent this 
when humans is involved, it is important that people do not constantly move and 
push, but that they instead move slow and safely. In these situations it can be 
concluded that the speed of the group’s movement increases the less stressed 
people are (Helbing & Johansson, 2009). If the pressure over a bottleneck gets 
too high, the opportunities to evacuate can be paralyzed. When this actually 
happens, it can also be very difficult to reduce the already built up pressure, as 
well as to release the people who has been trapped. The people in the back do 
not know how the situation actually looks, the pressure often continues. This 
was the cause of the very tragic disaster, which occurred during the discotheque 
fire in Gothenburg 1998. A bottleneck effect and the pressure as well as a high 
density led to people getting stuck in the doorway and jam caused no further 
people to evacuate. The people in the back did not know that the pressure they 
built up only obstructed the evacuation possibilities, as fast as someone in the 
front managed to get out, people from the back pushed harder. This tragically led 
to the loss of a lot of youngsters lives. (NFPA Fire Investigations Department, 
2000) This phenomenon is explained as an effect due to poor lack of back-to-
front communication (Sime, 1995). Back-to-front communication is also one of 
the reasons for the major loss of life in the 1989 Hillsborough incident, where 
people in the back of the crowd wanted to get in, not knowing that the people at 
the front rows were pressed up against the metal fence, and thus experiencing 
asphyxia which were the common cause of death (Sime, 1995). 
In another case, the main reason that could cause a problem is the lack of 
understanding pedestrian dynamics. A staircase right outside of the entrance of 
University of Maryland Comcast Center was given more focus in appearance than 
safety issues. The top of the stairs where about 40 % wider than the bottom of it. 
No one thought of the risks that this design could bring. If an emergency 
situation occurs, the capacity of 20,000 people would be exposed to a great risk 
of getting stuck in this bottleneck situation, or even crushed on their way out 
(Brannigan & Kilpatrick, 2004). 
The velocity through different bottlenecks follows the specific flow concept, 
which means that the speed depends linearly on the bottlenecks width. It also 
indicates that the flow through a bottleneck gets slower the longer the 
bottleneck is (Rupprecht, et al., 2010). There is a theory available that indicates 
how bottlenecks are linked to stop and go waves. It indicates how a smooth flow 
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of people, at a certain time, makes a transition to a pattern that instead reminds 
of stop and goes waves. This occurs when more people are trying to get in trough 
an opening than the number of people who is getting out of it (Helbing, et al., 
2007). 
There are several disasters where police and staff lock the exit gates in order to 
keep the peace and order. It has been witnessed by spectators that during a 
game in South America that a handful of fans entered the football field at a 
stadium after an undesirable call from the referee. This led the police to shoot 
teargas into the spectator stand and creating unbearable situation for the fans. In 
turn this caused a lot of people wanting to leave the scene but as the doors were 
locked, some people instead died due to the high pressure when being forced 
against the blockage as the passages got narrower (Still, 2014). 
4.4 Stop and go waves 
It has been shown that when a large crowd is moving, there are two different 
densities that affect, or split up how the movement pattern looks. The velocity in 
those three density groups that then is obtained is linear. In this case when 
talking about density, a distance to the person in front is instead talked about. 
Those three density groups are presented below (Appert-Rolland, et al., 2012). 
 When the density, or in this case, when the distance to the person in front is 
more than three meters the flow can continue without any stops. 
 Distance about one meter until around three meters makes it harder to walk 
in your own speed and sometimes the persons need to stop because of the 
more and more unstable crowd movement. 
 When the distance becomes less than one meter the flow gets strongly crowd 
dependent and stop and go waves are frequently seen at this density  
If the density of people is high simultaneously as the speed of the pedestrians is 
low, and drops beneath a certain level, stop and go waves do arise which turns 
out as longitudinally waves (Helbing, et al., 2007).  
 
Figure 7. Illustration of stop-and-go waves taken with long exposure time (Johansson, et al., 2008) 
The backward movement, or the stop and go behavior in the group is caused by 
low speed. When the movement is low people start to look around, which leads 
to stops and sometimes even collisions that gives backward forces. There are 
differences between individuals’ behaviors and preferences. How much space a 
person prefers differs as well as how fast a person reacts, which forms the basis 
of how quickly a person can start to walk again after the person has been 
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standing still. The probability of stop and go waves increases with the density. 
When the density is so high that the distance to the persons in front is one and a 
half meter, regular waves occurs (Portz & Seyfried, 2010). 
4.5 Turbulence 
Though a high density crowd can be compared to the functions of granular 
mediums (Helbing, et al., 2001), it is reasonable that density-driven waves can 
be created in conjunction with a forward motion. Likewise, it can be assumed 
that turbulent appearances do occur at even higher densities. This appearance 
can be compared with the aftermath of an earthquake, where various forces 
randomly are distributed in all the different directions (Helbing & Johansson, 
2009); (Ma, et al., 2013). 
When the density of a crowd that is under movement becomes even larger than 
what has been presented under stop and go waves, turbulence sometimes 
occurs. With a density of about 8 persons per square meter there is no longer 
any space between the persons, at this stage waves can move the individuals up 
to 3 meters in lateral directions. Crowd turbulence has for example been proven 
to be the cause of the Love Parade disaster. Video recordings revealed how 
people started to stumble when the pressure became too high (Helbing & 
Mukerji, 2012).  
 
Figure 8. Illustration of turbulence taken with long exposure time (Johansson, et al., 2008) 
Turbulence is created when a lot of people gathers in a restricted area. During 
the Love Parade disaster the density has been calculated to be around 11 
persons per square meter. When the pressure is so great that the individuals 
movements propagates through the body contact to persons in the vicinity, at 
such high densities this forces can propagate a long way. It has been found that 
the density remains unchanged, but that the speed of the individuals changes 
during these conditions. This speed fluctuation depends on the forces that are 
generated by body contact between individuals and it indicates that speed is a 
more important factor than density. Although these two factors nevertheless 
depend on each other it has been determined that pressure is the indicator that 
best can assist in calculating this phenomena (Ma, et al., 2013). The critical factor 
is pressure, which is caused by the density of people as well as the variety of 
speed. When turbulence occurs, pressure waves can be generated in all 
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directions. This is a very critical moment and there is a high probability that a 
person in the group could fall. When this happens it is possible that others will 
fall as well, which may cause people to be trampled to death. Attempts have been 
made to try to calculate when and where critical situations with turbulence will 
occur. One of the critical values that have been found depends on the pressure in 
the crowd. This unit depends on variation of speed as well as the density of the 
crowd. It has been found that if the pressure reaches a value of 0,02/s2 and if it is 
maintained, accidents will be likely to take place within minutes.  By video 
analyzing the crowd’s movement and density, together with this critical value it 
should be possible to hand out correct instructions to the safety personnel and 
further out to the pedestrians, which likely would help in order to avoid 
accidents with stampedes and crowd crushes (Helbing, et al., 2007). 
4.6 Stampede & Crowd crush 
When researching for different crowd disasters stampede seems to be a regular 
occurrence, especially at football stadiums when football games are played. A 
stampede is a collective rush of people towards either united direction or 
destination or in a random manner. The forces building up in crowds can be 
either vertical or horizontal. Whether people are standing up and thus pushing 
and leaning against each other creates a domino effect in a horizontal direction, 
or if people gather vertically as a pile, the fact is that this leads to great forces for 
people at the end of the of the crowd in the direction of the force 
(Schadschneider, et al., 2009); (Still, 2014). 
These forces propagate through the mass and the pressure causes compressive 
asphyxia. This is the cause of death, contrary to what media often reports that 
trampling is the reason why people die. This phenomenon is referred to as 
crowd crush and should not be viewed to be the same thing as a bottleneck jam, 
all though in both situations compressive asphyxia is the cause of death.  
It is not the crowd who are to be blamed for crowd disasters but instead it is 
poor management and planning which is the cause for these tragedies. In reality 
it is the amount of people in a concentrated space, the density, which is the 
biggest reason for a large number of deaths and injuries, but it could be avoided 
with proper design and management (Still, 2014). 
As this paper focuses on disasters mainly occurring at larger stadiums there 
have been various reasons to why a stampede occurs. The joint reason seems be 
heightened level of excitement for some initial triggering action. Here a few 
reasons will be presented that has been observed at real events.  
 Spectators are about to leave the stadium before the game is ended. A late 
minute goal, especially at high profile games like world cup qualifying games 
or important cup finals, make people wanting to re-enter the stadium. The 
sudden transition from despair and dissatisfaction to euphoria causes people 
to rush back into the spectator stands and thus causing crowd crushes. 
 Witnesses recalled that when trying to leave the arena from the stairs inside 
the stadium, for no apparent reason rather than by accident, someone trips 
and fall causing others to do same as a domino effect and this in turn leads to 
a crowd crush. 
 Violence seems to be a recurring factor causing stampedes and crowd crush. 
It may be as a result of a bad call by the referee or that competing team’ 
supporters engaging in a fight. This reason seems to be more frequent in 
South American countries compared to European countries.  
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 Fire may also allow people to act in a no regular order and thereby lead 
people to be subjects of stampedes (Still, 2014). 
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5. Evacuation modeling 
During a mass evacuation it is important to be able to evacuate a big arena, train 
station or any other area with a lot of people, and this must be done quickly and 
easily. To develop a wider knowledge about this, much research has been done 
in this field. During the last decades a lot of focus has been on implementing 
information, knowledge and other aspects that matters during an evacuation 
into computer models. The main reason has been to make it possible to 
implement more and larger tests. A computer model saves time and effort and 
can help to make the work more efficient. It is still important to understand that 
models are based on experimental studies and cannot fully be expected to reflect 
reality, these models should be seen more as a guide and a tool.  
When performing evacuation simulations, the aim is to determine whether or 
not a safe egress for all intended people in the building, public space or 
enclosure could be achieved. In order to assess this two different time sets are 
commonly used, RSET and ASET. RSET is the required safe egress time and ASET 
is the available safe egress time. The ASET during fire condition can be 
calculated through different methods to determine when critical condition for 
health safety is reached. Critical conditions may be toxicity, temperature, smoke 
layer height or visibility etc. RSET is a combination of different time periods, and 
the definition of the SFPE handbook suggest that (Nelson & Mowrer, 2002): 
RSET = td + ta + to + ti + te. 
The different terms in RSET is defined as follows (Nelson & Mowrer, 2002): 
td = Time from when the fire starts to detection of the fire. 
ta = Time from the detection to when people are notified. 
to = Time from notification to when people decide to start to act. 
ti = Time from decision to starting to act, i.e. start to move. 
te = Time from starting to move until a safe place is reached. 
If the evacuation is safe it means that RSET is considerably lower than ASET, i.e. 
it takes longer to reach critical condition for people than the time it takes to 
perform the process of evacuation. The last element, te in REST is the time that is 
usually simulated in computational simulations. The first two elements, td and ta 
depends on the performance of the fire alarm equipment. The remaining two 
elements, to and ti, are factors that depend on the occupants ability to make 
decision and is usually based on empirical studies and experimental 
observations (Nelson & Mowrer, 2002). 
5.1 Computer simulation programs 
In order to simulate and calculate evacuations, many different computer models 
have been developed. This is under rapid development. It is not possible to 
present all the models available and it would consequently be possible that some 
important programs will be missed in this report. The focus in the following 
chapter will be to present recently developed software, which considers to be at 
the forefront in the development.  
5.1.1 PedGo Guardian – Evacuation Support System 
This all started with an idea called the Hermes Project. The project has been 
developed in Germany and primarily been tested at the Esprit Arena in 
Dusseldorf. The aim was to produce an evacuation assistant that should be able 
33 
 
to calculate were and when critical situations could occur, in accordance to the 
crowd’s behavior and movements (Holl, et al., 2012). 
The Hermes Project formed the basis of the PedGo Guardian. PedGo Guardian is 
an assistant that is based on actual real-time simulations. In this way is it 
possible to analyze the crowd’s density and movements and together with 
underlying models it is then possible for the assistant to predict how the crowd 
will move and where different stages of critical situations are most likely to 
occur. The evacuation assistant, PedGo, is constantly conducting simulations. 
The assistant is aware of the thresholds for the different parts of the arena, those 
thresholds are based on the ASET time. When the simulation time for a certain 
part of the crowd exceeds these values, then warnings are sent out with 
messages on recommended preventive measures. The assistant is continually 
given information about the situation and how it changes, this includes if 
emergency exit are available or not, as well as the status of fire protection 
systems. In this way is it possible for the assistant to frequently give new 
information with upgraded instructions of how to best manage the situation. The 
aim of this assistant is mainly to help security staff, police and rescue services. 
The PedGo Guardian simulates 15 minutes into the future. In order to help 
security staff even more is the pedestrians divided in three different categories. 
Those are marked with green, yellow or red. These follow the logical order were 
green symbolizes that the area is under control and does not need back-up. 
Yellow indicates that there is a potential for elevated pressure and that assistant 
can soon be required. Finally, red which symbolizes that immediate assistance is 
required and that focus needs to be on evacuating this area (Klüpfel & Meyer-
König, 2012). 
5.1.2 Pathfinder  
Pathfinder, which is an evacuation simulating computer program, is one of the 
latest tools that have been developed and are used by today's fire engineers. 
Pathfinder uses Agent Based Modeling. The purpose of the program is to 
facilitate the work, but also to improve the results and the validity of simulations 
that regards mass evacuation. The program can treat tens of thousands of 
spectators. It is based on simulations with large number of spectators, all with 
their own individual characteristics. The subjects are assigned goals, 
characteristics and perceptions. This can be applied to larger groups as well as to 
each individual. The program is based on artificial intelligence, which means that 
the individuals also are able to adjust, based on other peoples’ movement. This 
allows people to avoid colliding with each other’s. It also means that the subjects 
does not strictly need to follow the shortest path principles. Something that 
naturally gives a better flow of the pedestrians compared to other models, which 
are based on different calculations. Pathfinder is built from a coordinate system 
in 3D, the structure of the system can be created directly from the program, but 
can also be imported from other applications, such as CAD software. During a 
simulation, the user can follow the progress, pause or rewind, just like in a 
regular movie. To further develop the program, the hope is to integrate it with 
FDS. There is also a desire to develop the dynamics of the program so that doors 
and similar could be both opened and closed (Thornton, et al., 2010).  
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6. Crowd Management 
To avoid accidents at events with large crowds the security staff needs to be 
prepared. A lot of guidelines and approaches have been developed. Some of 
those will be presented in the following chapter.  
6.1 Preparing & planning  
The biggest focus has so far been on teaching people how to handle and 
distinguish an actual fire. In order to develop peoples understanding in the 
future, more focus should be on teaching how to prevent and avoid fires. For 
example by teaching the society about different risk-sources (Hopper, et al., 
2002). 
During the last decade, the trend has been that risk mitigation measures 
constantly have become more important. The knowledge on how to handle 
crowds has developed, mainly because a better understanding of crowd 
dynamics and communication between people working at the arenas has been 
developed. Furthermore better and upgraded systems and methods are available 
for the security workers, which for example has made it easier to communicate 
with the crowd. Warning systems through communication, emergency signs, as 
well as regular alarms has evolved. Today, it is a natural step to analyze the 
building's design in new constructions, which has improved the integration 
between the natural flows of pedestrians out of a stadium to its exit doors and 
routes (Hoskin & Spearpoint, 2004). 
Before the Olympic Games in Beijing, 2008, simulations of the different stadiums 
and areas around were carried out. This was done with the Legion Studio V2006 
Software as a basis. Expected flows and densities were calculated, which became 
the basis for the analysis that was conducted. In this way, problem areas at an 
early stage could be found inside the stadium, but also in areas outside. The 
results that were produced could then be used to improve the planning of the 
area's structure as well as to improve the management planning (Zhu, et al., 
2008). Similarly, the program Smart Crowd has been used to simulate 
evacuations from the football team River Plates´ stadium in Buenos Aires. This 
program is based on the same principles, it takes into account every spectator 
and calculates the forces that affect each person. In this way, the program can 
determine the most suitable escape routes and it can predict areas with increased 
risks regarding high levels of densities and pressures (Moldovan, et al., 2005). 
6.2 Operational 
At big stadiums in Australia and New Zealand, methods have been developed 
about how to give information about risk sources and emergency strategies to 
raise their awareness around the emergency procedures. What they are 
supposed to do and how is illustrated on the big scoreboards, both before the 
game has started as well as during the half times. Illustrations about this is also 
available on the tickets, toilet doors as well as at the entrances (Hoskin & 
Spearpoint, 2004).This is a new safety concept that can be compared to the way 
airlines have been working in long times now, with pre-flight safety 
demonstrations.  
In 2006 there was stampede at the pilgrimage ritual in Makkah in Saudi Arabia. 
364 people died and some 300 were injured due to the high pressure that was 
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built up and propagated though the dense crowd. This resulted in the building of 
the new Jamarat building with five different levels to accommodate the 
approximately annual three million visitors. The new building has 12 entrances 
and 14 exits in order to distribute and disseminate the masses to appropriate 
scale. The installation of 700 cameras, which of 90 cameras uses automatic 
software to identify areas where critical conditions may occur. The organizers 
can then control the flow at the points where critical conditions are about to 
happen. In addition, scheduling of the attendees were also implemented, so that 
organizers know at when and where people would appear at site. All of these 
implementations made the pilgrimage at Makkah run more smoothly for the 
years following (Al Bosta, 2010). 
6.3 Guidelines – The Love Parade disaster 
In the aftermath of the Love Parade disaster a lot of research and studies was 
made in order to establish what was causing the accident, but also to learn how 
to prevent similar disasters in the future. The authors from one of them have 
compiled a guideline, with their thoughts of what are the most important aspects 
to be considered before and during an event of this magnitude (Helbing & 
Mukerji, 2012). 
6.3.1 Before the event 
In the following text, some of the most crucial points follow that the management 
team at the site needs to consider when hosting an event of great magnitude 
(Helbing & Mukerji, 2012). 
 The location of the festival area should ideally have been through similar 
events since before. It is also important that some of the persons, in the 
crowd management team, have experience as well as expertise about how 
to manage those crucial situations that could occur during such events. The 
management team should not only exist of locals. Professionals, with 
experience from national or global level, should also support them. 
 Before the event, a date should be set that will serve as a limit of when all 
the security work must have been implemented. Those that are involved 
and are a part of the crowd management team shall know what is expected 
of them. They shall also have been completed drills at this date. 
 During the planning phase, the expected number of visitors has to be 
considered instead of just planning after the capacity of the area. It is also 
important that an analysis is made regarding the in and out flows of the 
pedestrians, mainly to determine when the risk of large flow variations in 
is greatest. 
 It is vital to listen to all questions regarding the safety at the festival area. 
Even if only a small part of the group are concerned about a particular risk, 
this must be taken seriously. It is also important to let consultants give 
their expert opinions. 
6.3.2 During the event 
It is also important for the staff to know how they are supposed to handle 
different kinds of situations during the event. Guidelines have therefore been 
developed, which mostly depends on observing the density of people. The 
different hazards, or observations, have been ranked from 0-8. A suggestion 
follows after each one of them, telling the staff members how they are supposed 
to handle the different situations that could occur. It is also important for the 
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personnel to understand that a critical situation can escalate and change fast. 
Which makes it crucial to always be a few steps ahead of the actual situation of 
the scenario (Helbing & Mukerji, 2012). 
Table 1. Rule of thumb, regarding which actions that are required by the Crowd Management Teams, 
during an event. 
 Observation Assessment Actions 
0 Less than 2-3 
person/m2 
Normal 
operation 
Keep track of the flows, it is not 
allowed to exceed 82 people/minute 
and meter 
1 Certain areas 
begins to be 
crowded 
A bottleneck or 
similar situation 
occurs, which 
slows people 
down  
Inform the police about the situation 
and allocate personnel to the areas 
that need reinforcements. Narrow the 
inflow until the reason for the 
accumulation is determined 
2 The mass of the 
crowd 
constantly 
grows 
Lesser outflow 
then inflow, high 
and dangerous 
densities can 
occur over time 
Cooperate with the police and 
communicate with the crowd. Attempt 
to get people away from the critical 
area 
3 Shock waves 
occurs, and 
people are 
pushed 
People cannot 
walk in their 
own speed, high 
risks  
Open emergency routes, and tell the 
crowd about it, in order to ease the 
pressure. It is important that the 
police are ready to take over the 
control of the situation. 
4 It is impossible 
to move freely 
and people are 
squeezed 
between each 
other’s 
The density and 
pressure in the 
crowd can lead 
to injuries  
Now the police should get the highest 
responsibilities of the situation. It is 
vital to communicate with the crowd, 
in this situation is an evacuation 
recommended.  
5 People tries to 
get out of the 
area by 
violence 
Critical situation 
that may get out 
of control 
Now evacuation is needed, it is still 
important to speak and inform the 
crowd. The crowd management team 
should now inform hospitals and 
emergency units about the situation 
6 Crowd 
turbulence 
occurs 
A clear sign that 
a disaster soon 
could occur 
It is vital to calm down the crowd and 
inform them about the situation. Be 
ready to support and give first aid. 
Emergency teams needs to back up 
this situation. Continue evacuation. 
7 Stumbling 
makes people 
falling to the 
ground 
A crowd disaster 
is now 
happening and 
many will get 
injured  
The team needs to be ready to give 
first aid. The situation is crucial. It is 
also vital to further inform hospitals 
about the changed situation. 
8 People crawl 
over each other 
A disaster has 
happened 
A serious disaster has occurred, apply 
the rules for how to handle a serious 
emergency 
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6.4 Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds – The Green Guide 
This is a handbook that consists of guidelines regarding the safety on different 
sport arenas. The focus is on the safety of its spectators. It is especially designed 
in order to help engineers and others that are working with or are developing 
the safety at those arenas.  
All parts regarding the safety of a sports arena is handled in this guide. It ranges 
from how the security should be implemented during games to how to calculate 
the acceptable capacity of an arena. Beyond this fire safety and communication is 
also treated. The Green Guide will, just as it sounds, mainly serve as a guide or a 
manual that infers how security at a stadium could be achieved. The handbook 
does not consist of many clear rules, but instead mostly gives indications of what 
actions to take and who is supposed perform them. The demands on those actors 
are presented as well (Sports Grounds Safety Authority, 2008).  
After the disaster at Ibrox that occurred 1971, Lord Wheatley wrote a report on 
the need to increase the safety levels for sports stadiums. This report became the 
basis for the first edition of The Green Guide (Hillsborough Independent Panel, 
2012).  
According to the manual, it is not enough to have a written safety policy, the key 
is to follow it all and that all those that are involved knows their individual tasks. 
Also it points out how important it is to not only draw up contingency plans, but 
also to regularly test and practice them. The security in the stadiums should not 
be considered as a set of rules or conditions, but rather as different standards 
that shall help to establish an improved safety culture. It is important that a 
positive attitude is apparent from both the management team as well as from the 
security personnel. This will help in order to create a common feeling that the 
spectators and the safety personnel are working together towards an increased 
safety environment (Sports Grounds Safety Authority, 2008). 
If stadiums shall be able to handle a big accident it is a requirement that there is 
a thorough contingency plan available. This requires that all the parties know 
what is required of them in such a situation. Therefore, the management team at 
the stadium has to work with the municipality as well as the police and 
emergency services such as rescue team and ambulances. The guide also points 
out that the safety and the quality of stadiums should be examined regularly. The 
handbook states that this is not going to settle within a certain time interval. It 
rather suggests that this should be regulated based on every stadiums individual 
standard, quality and size. However has the Standing Committee on Structural 
Safety given a recommendation that indicates that this should be done between 
every 6-10 years (Sports Grounds Safety Authority, 2008). 
In order to enable the spectators to smoothly get in and out of the arena during 
both normal and critical situations, the routes, doors and stairs should be 
integrated naturally with the in and out flows of people. There are 
recommendations for distance, widths and how the routes and the stadium shall 
be designed in general. These recommendations also depend on the current 
distance to the stadium's center. The Green Guide also points out some of the 
risks that exist around the spectators and congestion. For example does the 
handbook point out hazards that may occur due to the security staffs attempts to 
facilitate a potentially hazardous situation. For example, the risks that comes 
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when new lanes or doors are opened, with the goal of trying to reduce the 
current pressure (Sports Grounds Safety Authority, 2008).  
6.5 MSB – Guidelines for events 
This is the Swedish safety guide for events. It has been developed by 
collaboration between the Swedish National Police Agency and the MSB, the 
Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency. The guide is designed to facilitate and assist 
all the stakeholders who are involved in dealing with the security at an event 
area. The aim is to create a common understanding regarding safety aspects, as 
well as to improve the communication and collaboration between these groups. 
The focus is mainly on how to prevent an emergency and to create a safe 
environment, but there are also some guidelines regarding the safety during the 
event (Säterhed, et al., 2008). 
There are three basic conditions that need to be fulfilled in order to have a good 
crowd management (Säterhed, et al., 2008). 
1. That the workers have a good understanding in the different situations that 
can occur. 
2. That the area has a structure that favors crowd management. 
3. To have a good communication between both the audience and the 
management team as well as between the various groups that is working 
with the safety in the area. 
It is important to analyze where each area's focus points are. These are areas 
where the risks are elevated due to possible crowd gathering. It is also important 
to analyze at what time the highest risks are expected, this could be routes 
where most people are expected or at a stage. Furthermore it is important to 
analyze the nature of the audience before the event to create an audience profile. 
Factors like age on the audience, what kind of music that will be played, if the 
artist or group appears to affect the audience's behavior in some way, alcohol 
and more depends in this profile (Säterhed, et al., 2008). 
To calculate the output rate, it is mainly the width of the exit routes or doors that 
matter. A measure that is used is that, if the surface is good, a maximum of 100 
people can be expected to pass per meter and minute. If stairs has to be used this 
number is reduced to 73 individuals per meter and minute (Säterhed, et al., 
2008); (Sports Grounds Safety Authority, 2008). 
These routes are of great importance though they are exposed to higher risks. 
There are primarily risks that are associated with the stop of flows, this can 
easily lead to increased pressures in a particular area. Some rules have been set 
to avoid this. The routes should be few and should as well consist of soft turns. 
The routes width should be the same throughout the whole passage, in order to 
avoid designs that evoke crowd crushes (Brannigan & Kilpatrick, 2004). It is also 
important to avoid having large routes that intersect, and that the routes do not 
pass through any stationary mobs (a place where a lot of people are assembled), 
such as through a stage area (Säterhed, et al., 2008). 
Though a crowd does not have the ability to communicate with itself, 
information between management team and the crowd should take place trough 
speakers, billboards or megaphones. In addition is it not possible to believe that 
correct information can spread from person to person in the crowd, the 
information will then be uncontrolled and the content will probably change, 
which can lead to false rumors. This further reinforce the importance of having a 
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sound system that allows the information to reach out to everyone in the 
audience. In addition to this it is possible to use a host on stage. This person can 
be used before or during a performance, though the audience is the most 
receptive during these times. It is important that the person that performs this 
task is respected by the audience (Säterhed, et al., 2008). 
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7. Analysis 
In this chapter we will analyze the different disaster mentioned in chapter 2. The 
purpose is to see if behaviors and movement patterns described in chapter 3 and 
4 can be observed. Some suggestions will be given to what was the cause for 
these disasters as well as possible improvements and actions that could have 
been taken in order to have prevented them. In addition, some general findings 
will be presented. 
7.1 Ibrox Football Stadium 
A clear pattern that can be distinguished is that many of the accidents that have 
taken place at various sports stadiums have occurred during the most important 
and high profile games. Often in classic games between rivals or in matches that 
have particular importance. “The Old Firm" derby between the Rangers and 
Celtic is a typical game that fulfills this point. 
When analyzing accidents that historically has taken place at the Ibrox stadium, 
there is an indication of elevated risks of “The Old Firm' derbies (Still, 2014). 
Although these derbies are a minority of all the matches played, almost all fatal 
accidents that have occurred on this football stadium happened in these 
matches. The assessment of these elevated risks considered mainly due to the 
elevated empathy for the spectators. People that attempt football matches easily 
fall in to the common emotion and behaviors of the audience's (Drury & Cocking, 
2007). The rivalry between these clubs have been built up over a long period of 
time, which often leads to that the spectators, more than during usual fights, at 
some points loses their natural- and rational behaviors. It is common that people 
are screaming, standing, jumping, and generally are noisy in these contexts. 
These behaviors escalate at especially dramatic events, such as goals or 
judgments. The euphoria, alternatively the anger and disappointment that in 
those moments arises, have in many cases led to irrational behaviors. Due to the 
dramatic end of the match at "The Old Firm" derby in 1971, it is estimated that 
most people's state of mind caused a degraded rational crowd behavior. One can 
imagine that people were euphoric, and that the movements on the way out of 
the stadium not followed the usual standards. This may have been an underlying 
cause of the elevated pressure that was created in the moving crowd, a pressure 
that in turn was the cause of this tragic accident.  
In addition to these elevated risks that exists in specific games it is notable that 
there are certain periods that are particularly critical during a game. Close to the 
start of the match, during half time or at the end of the game, most of the 
accidents happen. The reason for this probably goes hand in hand with an 
increased pressure obtained from the audience's side. It is at these moments that 
the audience moves for various reasons. When people start to move, each person 
gets a certain momentum, in conjunction with the many people that are moving 
closely together as a granular flow (Helbing & Johansson, 2009), every person’s 
momentum is added and summed up into the great mass movements. This leads 
to high pressures, generated in the crowds. The accidents that historically has 
taken place is mainly due to the fact that the exits and escape routes has a lack of 
capacity, and are not able to handle the size- or force from these flows. 
This was the case at Ibrox, for the disaster in 1971. Directly after the final 
whistle of the game, too many people tried to get out of the stadium at the same 
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time. When the pressure finally became overwhelming, a person stumbled, 
which in its turn led to a crowd crush (Walker, 2004).  
Before this accident occurred, the security at stadiums and sports grounds had 
barely been treated and there was simultaneously a lack of standards and rules. 
At this time, it was widely accepted to be exposed to high pressures when being 
part of a crowd at different sport grounds. Just as it was accepted to lose control 
of his or hers body movements and instead be brought into the mass´s 
movements. The Ibrox stadium, and especially stairway 13 had been through 
similar, though smaller, disasters with fatalities even before 1971. In order to 
avoid future accidents the staircase was renovated a few years before this 
accident. The club got attention and was praised for this action (Walker, 2004). 
However, when the disaster occurred in 1971, experts said in retrospective that 
the renovation of stairway 13 should have been done differently. Experts said 
that if focus had been on improving the design instead of just renovating it, this 
accident could have been avoided. The experts considered that the stairs instead 
should have been designed in zig-zag style, which would have brought down the 
speed and worked as natural turning points, in order to avoid high pressures 
when people left the stadium the exits should also have had a wider bottle 
compared to the top. This disaster led to the Weatley Report (Walker, 2004). A 
report regarding the security at English football stadiums, it highlighted the risks 
of different accidents and the need for rules and standards. Something that 
culminated into the first edition of, the Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds, or the 
“Green Guide”, as it is usually called. This guide is still the basis for the safety at 
English sports grounds (Sports Grounds Safety Authority, 2008).  
The conclusion that can be drawn from this accident is that the main reason was 
the incorrectly dimensioned escape route. Had the same situation occurred 
today, there would probably not have been any accident. By using simulations 
with programs such as Pathfinder, the improper design of stairway 13, which 
was unable to handle the current flow, could have been found beforehand. This 
in turn would have had led to a different design of the stairway to enhance the 
safety. One of the metaphors that have been described previously is the one of 
Colosseum. This classic arena consisted of a large number of outputs that 
basically led the audience straight out (Helbing & Mukerji, 2012). If safety had 
been the only significant point in the construction of a sports stadium, many 
venues could have taken a lesson from the structure of this arena and focus on 
having a large number of egress options. However, there are other important 
points, such as the looks and designs but perhaps primarily the desire to 
accommodate as many spectators as possible, due to the financial gain that each 
stadium can receive from each spectator. This is an ongoing battle that must be 
examined in every new construction and renovation and the economy is 
constantly the strongest interest. The knowledge that this indeed is the case 
makes it important for the engineers to highlight the economic benefits of 
actually implementing the safety properly and at an early stage, in order to avoid 
future costs that accidents can bring. 
7.2 Bradford City fire 
The cause of the fire is believed to be due to that one of the spectators at the site 
released a smoking and glowing object down under the stands, supposedly a 
cigarette stub. There were various factors that caused the spread of this fire. 
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Among other things, there was much trash and combustible materials under the 
stands, in which the fire could grow. In addition to this, there was a good supply 
of air though the floor of the grandstand since it was not sealed, due to cracks 
and gaps. As the floor furthermore consisted of dry, old wood and the distance to 
the source of the fire was small the fire could spread further. The final factor 
behind this rapid fire development was the roof. When the combustible gases 
and the flames reached the ceiling the spread dramatically increased. The rapid 
development also depends on the re-radiation. The fact that the roof 
furthermore consisted of asphalt tarpaulin gave the fire even more combustible 
material and the dripping asphalt both spread the fire as well as it wounded the 
spectators (Popplewell, 1985). 
It has afterwards been indicated that the exits of this stadium were too few and 
undersized. The evacuation of the stadium took long time even under normal 
circumstances. In addition, some of the doors were closed this day, which 
complicated the evacuation further. According to Popplewell (1985), if the 
“Green Guide” had been followed on this occasion, the accident would not have 
been able to occur. This guide highlighted the danger when garbage was 
collected under the stands. Nevertheless, it was found that trash had been 
accumulated under the main grandstand for about 20 years. In addition to this 
the guide stated that a wooden stand like the one at Valley Parade needed to be 
able to be fully evacuated in less than 2.5 minutes. This was deemed impossible 
by the Chief Inspector at the site (Popplewell, 1985). 
7.2.1 RSET vs ASET 
After watching videos of the fire (Ivan, 2010), it is easy to say that RSET was 
indeed longer than ASET. 
td = Time from when the fire starts to detection of the fire.  
From video footage available and the report and summary of details from the 
fire, the growth phase was very rapid. This leads to a belief that the spectators 
closest to the origin of the fire should have detected the fire in an early stage, as 
smoke developed early and rapidly became thicker and darker, hence more 
visible. This indicates that no fire detection system was present, and in the 
report of the fire there is no mentioning of such a thing (Popplewell, 1985). 
ta = Time from the detection to when people are notified.  
The stand was over 70 years old, built before the First World War, and 
constructed with a lot of wooden material. Because Bradford was at the time a 
division 3 club, it was not required to fulfill the guidelines of the “Green Guide” 
according to a newspaper article (Pithers & Pallister, 1985). These two factors 
combined with visible light grey smoke 3 minutes before people entered the 
field gives an estimation that automatic fire detection and warning system were 
not present at this facility (Popplewell, 1985). According to The Guardian 
newspaper, lower division clubs did not have the finances to enhance their 
stadiums safety issues (Pithers & Pallister, 1985). These allegations concur with 
the observations from video footage that the entire stand did not seem to have a 
grasp of the seriousness of the situation. From video we draw conclusion that no 
message or signal was given to indicate that there was a fire, based on the fact 
that police and staff urged people to start moving onto the field. Also as some 
people already starting to move in the stand, the players keep on playing, thus 
stealing the attention from the spectators from observing the danger of the fire.  
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A few people had already entered the field but the game still continues. A 
clearance out of bounds from the goalkeeper at the same time as more people 
enter the field brought the game to a halt.  
td and ta takes too much time in contrast to the rapid fire growth and especially 
as smoke was noticed. If this part of the evacuation had been performed 
properly, the outcome would probably not be as catastrophic, as time is valuable 
in case of fire. 
to = Time from notification to when people decide to start to act. 
ti = Time from decision to starting to act, i.e. start to move. 
to and ti could be assumed to be as one in this scenario as there are no necessary 
actions to engage in before starting to move, except for maybe try to fight the 
fire. But as this is a public place of assembly the spectators are more likely to 
stay in their role as spectators, and they probably suppose that staff and 
management will try to extinguish the fire. As seen from footage the people in 
the closest boundary of the fire start moving onto the field. By this time the 
flames are clearly visible and the smoke generation is quite extensive. The other 
spectators at the opposite side of the stand took a lot longer time from 
notification to decision of starting to move. This is understandable since the 
scenario develops in such a rapid way which probably surprised them. 
Supposedly there had been several public announcements from the speaker 
using the public address system to warn and urge the people to move on to the 
field. There is no evidence supporting this and the belief is that it was either too 
much noise or the public address system malfunctioned, maybe as a result of the 
fire. Video analysis shows that the magnitude of the flames was not too bad 
when the flames first came up through the floor and when the first people 
started to evacuate, although by this time the smoke was dense. From 
approximately a couple of square meters of flames transitioned into a rapid 
spread horizontally, the people still in the stand were those exposed to 
immediate danger.  
te = Time from starting to move until a safe place is reached.  
Because the exits were located at the back of the stand along a narrow and long 
corridor, the space quickly filled up with dense smoke, causing people to 
evacuate to the field. People had to jump over a fence, which could be considered 
as a type of bottleneck because the flow slowed down as this action took longer 
than walking down the stands. The field should not be considered as a safe place 
and by that mean this time element is indeed longer than necessary.  
7.2.2 Panic 
The conception of mass panic, at least in a fire scenario as this, could be 
discarded based on observation of video. At first it seems that people 
underestimated the seriousness of the initial fire. Photos taken from the stand at 
an early stage, as the fire was still concentrated to the space underneath the 
floor, show how people are still at the stand. Instead of starting to move at that 
point, people probably believed someone would come with a fire extinguisher. 
When the flames became visible and during the rapid spread from a couple of 
square meters of flames to a flashover and the entire stand in flames, people 
moved towards the field. They started rushing down the stand, jumping over the 
fence and then enter the field, as this seems to be the only rational thing to do. 
Therefore mass panic could be considered not to be the case. Once on the field 
you can see how a lot of people are cheering and dancing, which also disclaim 
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mass panic. The stand on the short side which was next to the main stand, no 
immediate actions were taken by the spectators. It was first when the entire 
stand was in flames that stand started to evacuate starting with the people 
closest to it. Most likely the heat was unbearable by this time. Also there is no 
observed competition between the evacuees, instead people are helpful to each 
other, especially helping those with problems getting over the fence as well as 
dragging people who had been disabled. Although it cannot be said with 
certainty that some people experienced panic, the crowd did not seem to suffer 
from mass panic. 
7.2.3 Conclusions 
 Design and dimension of escape routes were inadequate. 
 Combustible material should not be able to accumulate under the stands. 
 The construction of the stand should not exist of combustible material. This 
caused the fire phase to develop rapidly.  
 No signs of mass panic could be observed. 
 Evacuation should have started earlier when smoke and flames were 
noticed.  
7.3 Hillsborough disaster 
The match had a particularly importance, as it was the semifinals of the FA Cup 
in England. This further demonstrates the elevated risks that are associated with 
these high profile games. Also it indicates that the acceptance of risk aspects 
differs depending on the character of the game. 
One of the first conclusions that an analysis of this disaster gives is that it 
highlighted the importance of having a crowd management team with elaborated 
contingency plans. Both at the site, but also that it is important to early on, have 
discussed various critical situations that may arise.  
The problems this day started even before the game because of a large part of 
the audience was delayed. Something that led to higher pressures over the 
inputs than regularly, neither the structure of the building or the police were 
able to handle this (Stuart-Smith, 1998); (Hillsborough Independent Panel, 
2012).  
Regarding the stadium's design, the biggest mistake was, that the high metal 
fences were placed between the stands and the pitch (Stuart-Smith, 1998); 
(Hillsborough Independent Panel, 2012). This fence was most likely placed there 
to prevent fans from entering the pitch to cause disturbance. But in this case it 
was a death trap. The great forces from the entering fans pressed the people in 
front against the metal fence and they died mostly due to compressive asphyxia. 
Here it is find out that the lack of back-to-front communication was one of the 
catastrophic factors. The people in the back had no idea of the trouble at the first 
couple of rows at the stand. 
A simulation with today's technology would probably have pointed out that 
those people had a risk of being subjected to high pressures. The most natural 
thing would be to eliminate these fences, as they constituted the greatest danger. 
After this accident all stadiums in England removed fences at the front rows. 
Another problem was that people did not manage to enter the stadium quickly 
enough which indicates that the design should have been different. More and 
wider entrances would enable more people to get in, but it is equally important 
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that the flows can allow spectators to their individual seats in the stands, to 
avoid constipation. Meaning that the flows should be naturally integrated 
throughout the entire passage. If this is not achieved, critical situations like 
bottlenecks could occur, and can lead to even worse situations like crowd 
crushes and jam of people at gates or door openings. 
It is easy to be wise in the aftermath. Some of the measures, particularly what 
the police should have done differently is presented below. There will also be 
some suggestions on how the structure of the stadium instead should have been 
dimensioned to reduce the probabilities of critical conditions. 
The first action that the police on the scene should have taken, along with the 
crowd management team, is to postpone the start of the match even longer than 
already had been done. The reason that a new entrance was opened, which is not 
usually the case, was enabling the spectators’ entrance into the stadium in time 
before kickoff. However, they did not manage the security requirements, 
including the missing of policemen or stewards available in the tunnel to direct 
the audience up to their seats. Had the game simply been postponed further 
along with the police informing the spectators about this, the fans may have been 
calmed down. The risk of high pressure would then most likely have been 
eliminated in a simple and easy manner.  
However, there are unfortunately conflicting interests regarding such an action, 
as our analysis previously spoke of it is often the economic interests that weigh 
heaviest. The focus has fallen on financial gain, it is sponsors, broadcasters and 
betting sites that currently control where and when the various matches will be 
played. This makes the whole situation even more problematic and even if a 
situation like this should occur today, it would probably be difficult for the police 
and stewards to get such a desire through, to postpone the game.  
Having this said, it is therefore even more important to have elaborate 
contingency plans, mainly because it will help the security staff to feel confident 
in how to act, but also for them to be able to have a solid foundation to stand on 
and that can be used as an argument against these conflicting interest groups. 
Another mistake the police force made was that they assumed that the 
spectators tried to force themselves in to the field. In fact, it was the pressure 
from the audience that forced them against the fences.  
Though the pressure does not only depend on the density of people but also on 
speed and movements was a bad move from the security team. In order to keep 
spectators away from the pitch had high steel railings been located between the 
pitch and the stands. The pressure was so high that some of the railing collapsed 
and a crowd crush happened. The cause of the deaths was asphyxia, mainly 
caused because the people at the front rows were pressed against the metal 
fence, hence suffering from loss of air (Stuart-Smith, 1998); (Hillsborough 
Independent Panel, 2012). It has been admitted, a long time after the disaster, 
that the police withheld the truth from both fans and media. They already knew 
at the match day that the safety could not be maintained. Furthermore, in 
connection with the accident, a large part of the police force did not understand 
the seriousness of the incident and therefore acted inappropriately. They 
assumed that people tried to invade the field. This led to the fact that the police 
initially kept people away, instead of helping them. In addition to this neither the 
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police nor the security workers directed the crowd to their seats after they 
entered, which they usually did (Hillsborough Independent Panel, 2012). 
This incident attracted much attention and led to the accident report that is 
known under the name, the Taylor Report (1989). A report that led to changes 
concerning the security in sports grounds. The main changes were that fences no 
longer got to serve as a barrier between the stands and the pitch. In addition, it 
was mandatory that all stadiums would consist of only seating. Something that 
would serve as a check point on that not too many people are allowed in to the 
grounds (Stuart-Smith, 1998); (Taylor, 1989); (Hillsborough Independent Panel, 
2012). 
The analysis of this disaster indicates that it seems that the police lacked an 
understanding about the risks related to metal fences, something that their 
actions speak for. It also seems that the communication on several occasions was 
insufficient, mainly because a large part of the force focused on keeping people 
away instead of helping them. Even though the situation then had been critical 
for a long time. Some of the measures that should have been implemented and 
are considered most important are summarized in the following list. 
• Postponed the match, thus giving the spectators more peace for their way into 
the stadium. This should have reduced the pressure. 
• Have police officers in the tunnel, to assist in directing and holding discipline. 
• Gain a greater understanding of the risk with the fences as well as that they 
should have worked more for the audience benefits than against them. 
7.4 The Love Parade disaster 
Initially a too large number of visitors were released into the area. This area had 
a capacity of 250 000 visitors. In retrospect, it was unclear exactly how many 
people were found inside the area of the accident, but most evidence indicates 
that over 1 million people were at the site when the accident occurred. This 
means that the area was populated for over 400% of its capacity. It is sufficient 
to only see this number in order to understand how high the risks must have 
been inside the festival area. Mainly risks associated with high pressure during 
the movement of the crowds inside the area were present. Because the entrance 
and exit paths were closed for nearly an hour, a high pressure was created. 
When this accident was analyzed it was easy to see a connection to the different 
movement patterns that have been found to occur in crowds, those movements 
have been presented further in chapter 4. In the following text the patterns that 
emerged and were behind the accident are presented. 
 Counter Flows – One thing that happened this day was that two flows met 
each other, a phenomenon called counter flows. One of the flows came from a 
tunnel that led people into the area, and the second came from an oncoming 
ramp that was used by people inside the area. This counter flow made it 
more difficult for those persons who wanted move away from this area. In 
addition, the tunnel was used as both entrance and exit to the festival area. 
This mean that people were walking in both directions in the tunnel, thus 
counter flows existed in the tunnel as well. To prevent this from happening, 
the tunnel could have been divided into two lanes. One lane for exit and one 
47 
 
for entrance which could have generated a better and more constant flow. 
Another way to prevent this could have been to have exit and entrance in one 
direction, one end of the tunnel could form the entrance and the opposite 
used for exit. This way is probably less desirable arrangement since this 
could result in a detour. 
 
 Bottleneck - Furthermore a bottleneck situation was formed. This occurred 
when the flow of new arrivals, from the tunnel, was bigger than the people 
who managed to get on, mostly up on a ramp that would lead people away 
from the area in question. One of the causes behind this critical situation was 
that the ramp was not used to its full capacity, as it was designed for. The 
ramp had been provided with fences on the side, probably from a safety 
perspective. However, these fences primarily led to a decreasing of the 
ramp’s input which gave a lower flow rate than expected. The purpose of the 
fences is difficult to understand, since the areas behind the fences do not 
seem to be used for anything special. Personnel who work with preventive 
measures as well as active security at stadiums and similar areas should 
understand the risks associated with this phenomenon. They should 
understand which zones within the area that is most critical, i.e. where there 
is an increased probability for this phenomenon to occur. Analyzing and 
finding of these elevated risk areas makes it easier to eliminate or reduce 
those risks. Preventive measures can be made calculating predicted flows 
and then comparing these flows to the size and the capacity of the inlets. 
Simulations like this can be made by programs as Pathfinder. In this way the 
simulations can calculate how different designs on walkways and openings 
will influence the situation. In addition to this preventive action, more direct 
measures can be used by crowd management. If security personnel know 
about those critical zones, strategies can be developed at an early stage. If the 
parties- and individuals involved knows what is expected of them the 
possibility of a disaster could be reduced. 
 
 Turbulence - The last phenomena or pattern that was detected in this crowd 
was turbulence. When people were accumulating between the ramp and the 
tunnel it was only a matter of time until this pressure would be too high. 
Turbulence has been proven to be a clear sign before an accident in a crowd 
will occur. In a situation like this, with critical density and pressure, it is 
difficult for the police and security guards to be able to counter the situation. 
An attempt was made when the police shouted in their megaphones that the 
tunnel could no longer be used by the new arrivals. However, this was not 
taken seriously, and people continued to fill up in spite of this 
announcement. This situation displays the importance of knowing what to do 
and how. If the police had had a well-elaborated tactic they would probably 
have deployed police officers in the beginning of the tunnel. Such an action 
would have reinforced the message that it, for that time, was prohibited for 
new people to enter the festival area.  
It is a good finding that these patterns actually occurs because it gives the 
opportunity to gain knowledge about at which densities and speeds various 
phenomena occur. This can result in better developed and improved simulation 
programs. Hopefully these programs will be able to alert, for example the police, 
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where and when critical conditions are achieved in the crowds. There have been 
attempts where cameras have been set up during the pilgrimages to Mecca, in 
almost the same way works the German PedGo simulator. This simulator is used 
to predict crowd flows during a football match, but could also have been used at 
the Love Parade. Regarding how the development curve looks like in various 
parts of the crowd, alerts can be sent out. In order to further develop these 
simulation programs, unfortunately, similar accidents are required in the future. 
There are still too few accidents that actually have been filmed and documented 
like this festival accident in Germany. It is therefore dangerous to draw too many 
conclusions with only this accident as a basis. It is possible to draw conclusions 
at which density and velocity or at what pressure, different phenomena actually 
occurred. This gives a good indication of what levels that actually are critical in 
similar crowds but the situation may be different depending on a lot of different 
factors. Those factors and uncertainties have been presented further in chapter 
3. The knowledge about those uncertainties makes it important to gather more 
information and to continue to develop this relatively new field. 
This accident also showed the importance of being well prepared. This applies to 
everyone involved, from the police to the event workers. After analyzing the 
available material from this accident it seems that the communication between 
the different groups failed during this event. A conclusion that can be drawn is 
that communication is one of the most important factors in crowd management. 
If this communication is failing, different parties may sometimes even work 
against each other more than they help. It is also important that everyone 
involved knows what is expected of them and how they are supposed to handle 
the different kinds of situations that may arise. This indicates that preparation 
and training often pays off. However, it is impossible to successfully prepare for 
all accidents or situations that might arise. Therefore, it is important to have 
general plans and have a wide range of thinking when these contingency plans 
are developed. 
The accident was, as mentioned earlier, caused when too many people began to 
accumulate in the vicinity of a ramp, the ramp was also in connection with a 
tunnel where new spectator constantly flooded in. One of the reasons for this 
accumulation was due to that the festival was postponed for an hour, which 
meant that the pressure increased even more once they finally were allowed into 
the area. The crowd's density in the area of the incident has subsequently been 
measured to be over 10 persons per square meter, this confirms that there was 
no coincident behind the accident. This extreme density is an indication that 
turbulence set in. Another interesting angle is that despite that this critical 
phenomena occurred, no mass panic could be seen, something that has been 
debated heavily during the last decades whether it is a phenomena that occurs 
or not during disasters (Helbing & Mukerji, 2012).  
Regarding the bad planning, one major mistake was made even before the 
festival had begun. This was the first year that the festival took place in Duisburg. 
Since previous years, even though the festival had not taken place in Duisburg, 
the organizers knew early that they could expect more than a million visitors. 
Despite this, they also knew that this new area had a limited capacity that would 
have difficulties to cope with this crowd pressure. According to available 
documents the area could manage a load of 250 000 people. Previous years this 
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festival was held in a number of other cities. Occasionally it had been canceled 
because it was considered unsatisfying regarding the safety requirements and 
some accidents and emergencies also occurred (Helbing & Mukerji, 2012); 
(Klüpfel, 2012). The aftermath of the 2010 Love Parade disaster resulted in a 
series of guidelines regarding how the handling of safety work should be 
implemented on similar events in the future (Helbing & Mukerji, 2012) 
7.5 Development through history 
Accidents at large stadiums have long been a well-known fact, which for example 
can be seen in the design and evacuation possibilities of historical stadiums. One 
of the oldest example of this is the historical building Colosseum, an arena that 
was built during the Roman Empire and most of it still exist today. Regarding 
evacuation time, this arena is still considered to be able to compete with today's 
stadiums. Although Colosseum had room for up to 70,000 people, calculations 
reveal that it probably could have been completely emptied in only 5 minutes. A 
time that that not many of today’s stadiums can beat. The major reason that this 
arena differentiates from today's stadiums is particularly the availability of exits. 
Colosseum consisted of more than 60 large outputs located around the entire 
arena (Helbing & Mukerji, 2012). The stadiums today usually do not have that 
many ingress or egress options. Instead there are a couple of main entrances in 
order to access the stadium, then there are a lot more entrances to the different 
sections of the stands. This means that during ingress or egress a lot of people 
are situated in a confined space which in turn can lead to congestions at 
bottlenecks. When having as many entrances as Colosseum the flow of people is 
probably more constant and faster. The possibility of accidents at bottlenecks 
also decreases as the density level probably not reaches critical limits. 
Disasters regarding football arenas have since the early 1900’s mainly been an 
effect of poor building structure and construction engineering. The reason for 
peoples’ death was often that parts of the arena collapsed, e.g. a section, a fence 
or a wall. In the mid 1900’s and later in recent times these errors seem to be less 
frequent and instead it’s mainly due to overcrowding that disasters occur. When 
researching for crowd disaster in general, a lot of them seems to be connected to 
just football. According to a list of some crowd disasters a majority happened at 
stadiums (Helbing, et al., 2002); (Still, 2014). Why accidents regularly occur at 
stadiums is something that should further be explored and studied. From this list 
we can draw the conclusion that the magnitude of the disasters tend to decrease 
over time. The closer until present times, less people dies. One explanation might 
be that crowd management has improved as well as more regulations have been 
implemented.  
It is interesting that the number of deaths has decreased in recent times 
(Helbing, et al., 2002). There might be several explanations to this. Firstly we 
believe that engineering has improved over the years and less accidents due to 
collapses of the structure occurs. Secondly, regulations on maximum capacity are 
taken more seriously and intentional overcrowding is probably less frequent. 
Also crowd management seems to be focused more upon, for example through 
the “Green Guide” which highlights aspects to consider in order to maintaining 
public safety. 
Disasters and the possibility of them, especially at larger sport stadiums, seem to 
be recognized in most of the literature studied for this report. Much of the 
literature uses sport stadiums as example for evacuation for large number of 
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people from a complex environment. This is an indication that safety at sports 
ground is being considered, and that focus is put on maximizing the security and 
prevention of crowd disasters. 
7.6 Wrongful definition 
Stampede seems to be an expression used to describe a chaotic state in which 
people get crushed. The definition of stampede is originally used for when herd 
animals start rushing for no clear purpose. In terms of crowd disaster there does 
not always seem to be a rushing of people in order to define it as stampede. 
Instead in crowd disaster and mass evacuation literature, stampede is used as 
when people are crushed due to forces included with high density. In some 
disasters there is an indicator that something influenced people to suddenly 
move in a hasty manner, thus complying with the original definition. Example of 
this is when a late minute goal suddenly makes a lot of people who are about to 
leave, to re-enter the stands for celebration. There have been various disasters 
where this is the reason for a stampede to occur. For many cases though, 
stampede seems to be a synonym for being trampled to death. In those cases 
turbulence is probably a better description than stampede. For pilgrimages 
stampede is frequently used to describe the reason for crowd disasters, often 
implying that people have been trampled to death. Even for these scenarios 
turbulence is considered a better fit, as a collective rush has not been observed. 
The main reasons instead seem to have been due to high pressures in those 
moving crowds. 
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8. Discussion  
Many reports about crowd dynamics discusses the concept of panic and how 
management can mitigate this phenomena. This is contrary to the findings of 
Fahy and colleagues (Fahy, et al., 2009), which concludes that it is rare. If it is 
mentioned in various reports it gives us an indication that panic is a problem in 
at least crowd dynamics. The reports about panic in fire situations discusses that 
it does not happen, or at least is a rare occurrence. Most reports indicate that 
panic does not happen in an early stage, when the alarm sounds, or due to initial 
cues like visible flames or smoke, smell of smoke. What do we know about what 
happens when people are trapped in an enclosure and has no or at least limited 
means to get out. If such an incident occurs and if there are no video recordings 
or survivor statements, it is difficult to analyze what happens inside as these 
people are trapped. We believe that during these circumstances panic is most 
likely possible as people probably do recognize that their life is about to end. 
When panic is discussed in crowd emergencies we believe this might occur at 
highly density crowds as turbulence sets in or in jamming situations when a 
door or path is being blocked. On the other hand, research about panic for people 
who are about to die because they are trapped in an enclosure might be 
considered unnecessary. 
The term mass evacuation is hard to define. Is it the number of people involved 
that determines if it is a mass evacuation or is it maybe the structural 
knowledge? Our belief is that it should be called a mass evacuation if it happens 
at a public place where a lot of people are involved, e.g. parades, pilgrimage, 
sporting grounds and at venues such as concerts, underground metro station, 
festivals and fairs etc. If an evacuation happens in a building where people have 
prior knowledge of escape routes and even if there is a high number of people 
needing to evacuate, there might be strategies so that high densities are not 
achieved.  
When searching for literature regarding mass evacuation, most available 
information is regarding evacuation due to natural disaster such as floods, 
storms, tsunamis or earthquakes. It seems like there is not much research on 
mass evacuation in enclosures and buildings such as arenas and venues. Maybe 
each arena have their own contingency plans and strategies and keep it to 
themselves, and thus we are not able to access this material. Considering the fact 
that sport grounds are frequently related with crowd disaster, specific 
contingency plans should exist at all larger stadiums. The question is how to 
regulate this? Should it be by law or is it an organizational matter. When 
discussing football, at least the world football organization FIFA should be 
included to make sure that all football arenas prioritize public safety. 
In disasters according to the literature we study, it seems that it is not during the 
evacuation phase that people are most likely to die. Instead these phenomena 
like jams in a bottleneck scenario or crowd crush and trampling seems to happen 
due to the high density of people. As this paper initially was set out to focus on 
the evacuation, rather than what happens in large crowd, not enough 
information has been found during evacuation of larger stadiums. Before this 
study our belief was that there first had to be some kind of threat to justify an 
evacuation. Then at some point when densities get too big or there is a blockage, 
then trampling and crushing would occur. At the different events we studied, at 
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least those at sporting grounds, only the people in the area of high density died 
or got injured. This indicates that the evacuation of stadiums works well, but that 
poor management of many people is the cause for these tragedies to occur.  
Also the design is of importance to obtain crowd safety. In the Hillsborough 
disaster, one major reason for the magnitude of this incident is the placement of 
a metal fence at the first row to separate the crowd from the field. When the 
pressure from the entering supporters propagated from the back to the front, the 
spectators closest to the field had no way to go. We assess that this incident 
probably affected the design of future arenas, as it is rare to see metal fences for 
the spectators at arenas today. The reason for having this fences was most likely 
to ensure the safety of the football players. When analyzing the Hillsborough 
accident it seems that it was only the first couple of rows that experienced the 
high pressure and got pressed against the fence. What is interesting is that 
according to recent statements from police in England they were aware of the 
danger involved in such high profile games (Källström, 2014).  
In many cases it seems that officials and management for the events does not 
take their responsibility for the events. In many cases they blame the accidents 
on the spectators and the total crowd, even if the people in charge know they 
have the responsibility.  
As mentioned above, there does not have to be an emergent threat to cause 
congestions and overcrowding leading to peoples’ death. Also not every disaster 
in large crowds happens during evacuation egress but could just as well happen 
during the ingress phase. The sale at large retail stores in the United States 
during the holiday of Black Friday is a great example of this. The major discount 
offers from these stores attract a large number of people. When the store opens a 
lot of people try to enter the store at once. Stampedes are frequently observed 
and the extremely high densities at bottlenecks can cause jams. Competitive 
behavior is often implied in these situations as people have a desire to make the 
best deals on goods (Dawson, 2010).   
A majority of the accidents at sports grounds seems to occur in developing 
countries such as some African, South American, Central American, or Asians 
countries (Helbing, et al., 2002). Many of the disasters occurring at stadiums in 
these countries are generally due to a heavy overcrowding that causes people to 
die. Cultural and social differences and how well developed the country might be 
some explanations to why crowd disasters are more frequent in those countries. 
Another difference is probably the interest for football. Only high profile games 
will fill up the stadium in Sweden, compared to for example Spain or England, or 
the developing countries, where a sold out stadium can often be expected.  
There have been situations where capacities of between 60,000 and 70,000 for 
the stadium actually took a total amount of more than 120,000 people (Still, 
2014). For some scenarios too many tickets were sold and thus it was indeed the 
organizers fault as they intentionally made the decision to overcrowd the 
stadium. In other cases the fans forced their way into the stadium and that 
makes it harder to anticipate that a disaster might take place. On the other hand 
a lot of these disaster happen during high profile games. Therefore it is 
justifiable to increase security staff for those types of games to prevent these 
disaster to even happen in the first place.  
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The reason for intentionally overcrowding by selling more tickets and force 
more spectators into the stadium than it has capacity for are most likely money. 
One question that arises is why is more frequent in developing countries in 
recent years. Are the organizers more willing to accept the risk compared to in 
European countries? On the other hand the organizers might think they do the 
fans a favor by letting more people attend, and most likely the atmosphere will 
increase with more people. Better atmosphere and more cheering might give a 
boost for the home team players which can justify the overcrowding. Some of the 
games that had been overcrowded were World Cup qualifying games. Who is 
ultimately to blame here? Is it FIFA or is it the domestic football association for 
the specific country?  
To prevent stadiums to be overcrowded, standing sections should not be 
allowed. If a stadium only have sitting seats, people are organized in structural 
pattern. The capacity can then easily be determined. For a standing section 
capacity can vary depending on the management, i.e. how many people are 
allowed to that section. When having seats, people are organized in rows, which 
act as a natural barrier between people in different rows. This will prohibit 
forces to build up and keep densities in reasonable ranges. The Bradford fire and 
the Hillsborough disaster caused England to have their stadiums with only 
seated sections. 
It is easy to see where the development of this area is going. Like most areas is 
mass evacuation has under a strong scientific and technological development. 
That is to say, more and more knowledge is stored into more powerful models. 
With these models a new world has opened up, where simulations can easily be 
implemented at stadiums with a capacity of several 10 thousands of spectators. 
Which was impossible a few years ago. However, it is important to understand 
what these computer programs are made up of, and to understand what the 
basis of these programs and models are. It is mainly experimental and different 
analyzes of actual events that these models are based on. After analyzes of those 
experiments and events, patterns, movements and behaviors have been 
explained with the attempt of mathematical models. It is these mathematical 
equations that form the basis for today's computer models. 
It is nevertheless important to be critical and to understand that there are still 
limitations to these models. One of the reasons is that most of the experiments, 
which historically has been conducted has been based on certain homogeneous 
groups. It has often been healthy young men such as soldiers and students who 
constituted the test subjects. This fact leads to uncertainties, particularly around 
how these movement patterns and behaviors can actually be applied to other 
homogeneous groups and foremost about how these can be applied to a regular 
group of people. A normal random group of people in today's society consists 
usually of a mixture of many different ethnicities, ages and genders. Beyond that 
a large part of the society's individual’s has disabilities to various degrees. This 
fact makes it difficult to believe that such test groups can indeed be regarded as a 
sufficiently credible foundation stone for these simulation models. In many of 
the models available today, it is easy to give different individuals different 
physical characteristics. There are many tests that have been made about this 
physical part and then perhaps mainly around walking speeds for different age 
groups and genders and so one. However, it is difficult to measure the 
differences in a more psychological level both for various persons as for different 
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groups. To eliminate these uncertainties and thus manages to improve future 
simulations further research should be conducted on real events. In addition 
more experiments on mass evacuation should be executed, particularly with test 
groups reflecting reality in a more equitable manner than it has been in the past.  
There are some limitations in the PedGo assistant, mainly since it is based on 
different probabilities and assumptions about of how the crowds will move. 
When the people are controlled by a variety of factors, including emotions and 
psychology, it is impossible to completely simulate the future in a 
comprehensive manner. Additionally, this program simulates 15 minutes into 
the future, something that may seem unnecessarily long when the most critical 
situations on football matches take place in conjunction with the start of the 
game, half or the final whistle when people start moving. The critical situations 
that throughout history have occurred have often escalated quickly. It is doubtful 
that an assistant like this would have had time to help as well as instruct the 
police or the security staffs on site in time before these critical situations arise. 
Pathfinder is based on artificial intelligence, something that makes people both 
trying to get out of the stadium by the shortest possible route but at the same 
time, they can take new decisions depending on whether it comes persons or 
objects in their path. This eliminates some limitations that have been found in 
other simulation software, for example, that moving people get stuck and cannot 
get past each other. The main limitation of this program is really the same as 
mentioned earlier, that the intelligence not has been developed as much about 
all the psychological behaviors that we humans constantly use. This relates to 
the need to conduct more experiments and analysis of behaviors during these 
mass evacuations situations. Another limitation of this program is that it 
currently it is not possible to simulate with fires. However, this is a project that is 
currently being developed and it is hoped that the program should in future be 
cooperative with FDS, (fire dynamic simulator).  
Some literature used in this paper might be questioned regarding the relevance. 
One factor that might be different today is the difference between genders. As 
today’s society strive towards more equality between men and women, the 
actions taken during an evacuation might have changed as well. The literature 
used is from 1980 which might not be considered to be too old, but still it is not a 
reflection of the relations between genders as of 2014.  
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9. Conclusions 
The field of evacuation has during the last couple of decades gotten more 
attention and focus. The research has improved over the years especially as 
technology has developed exponentially. The symposiums for Human Behavior 
in Fire as well as Pedestrian Dynamics and Evacuation have certainly had an 
impact. It allows researchers and scientist to share and explore the field more. So 
far most experiments and studies have primary been focusing on smaller test 
groups and populations, with not enough heterogeneous groups to reflect the 
reality.  
The development of recent software as PedGo Guardian and evacuation 
simulation programs like Pathfinder makes it possible to evaluate problematic 
aspects for buildings in crowded situations when evacuation is needed. These 
software are based on the research conducted, which justify more research for 
larger crowds. 
Crowd disasters, especially those at football stadiums, have motivated 
improvements to ensure public safety. Planning and preparedness as well as 
crowd management to control the people is one way to ensure this. The other 
aspect is to ensure that the building and the environment can provide safety for 
ingress, duration and egress for occupants within a building or enclosure. 
One aim was to identify problem areas regarding mass evacuation. The findings 
of this paper suggest that the major problem is the amount people gathered in a 
confined space. Most problems regarding mass evacuations seem to be 
connected to overcrowded spaces. In the future more studies should be directed 
to situations and locations where overcrowding may occur in order to prevent 
further disasters. 
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